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Abstract
Employee ownership and participation effects on firm outcomes
by
Brent Kramer
Adviser: Professor Harvey Gram
Hundreds of firms in the U.S. are majority-owned by their employees through
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). This study measures whether employee
ownership makes a difference in firm outcomes, looking also at effects of worker
participation in management-type decisions. Theorists have suggested that the rarity of
employee ownership is prima facie evidence that such firms could not be as efficient as
traditional firms. But institutional and financing constraints may be a more realistic
explanation for their rarity, and it is important for policy purposes to investigate
efficiency objectively.
The author compares sales per employee for a panel of over 300 majority-
employee-owned (EO) firms in the United States with a panel of closely matched,
traditionally-owned (KO) firms. Responses from a survey of firm work practices are used
to estimate worker participation effects.
Sales per employee is substantially and significantly higher for the employee-
owned group of firms. This “employee-owned advantage” is significantly greater among
smaller firms, and (holding firm size constant) improves as the dollar value of the
average employee’s ownership stake in firm stock goes up. Holding both firm size and
employee stake constant, the employee-owned advantage is substantially (though not
significantly) greater in the large group of firms which are 100% owned by their ESOP
v
Trusts. Holding firm size constant, increased production-worker influence on three facets
of firm innovation also improves the advantage.
Resistance to broadening employee ownership may come in part from academic
arguments that such a structure must reduce firm (and thus social) efficiency. This study
belies those arguments. Broader employee ownership and employee participation in firm
management, which have intrinsic social benefits, improve firm outcomes as well.
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Employee ownership and participation effects on firm outcomes
The form of association, however, which if mankind continues to improve,
must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist
between a capitalist as chief, and work-people without a voice in the
management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of
equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their
operations, and working under managers elected and removable by
themselves (John Stuart Mill 1852, cited in Dow 2003).
Introduction:  Why Industrial Democracy?
In his analysis of waste in the modern economy, Michael Perelman (2000) notes
that frequent observers have made claims similar to those of Benjamin Franklin in 1784:
if every man and woman were to work for four hours each day on some
thing useful, that labour would be sufficient to procure all the necessaries
and comforts of life, want and misery would be banished out of the world,
and the rest of the twenty-four hours might be leisure and pleasure (cited
in Smyth 1905-1907 v.9, p.246).
Leaving aside the details of Franklin’s estimation and the ambiguity of what “useful”
work might be, this observation reminds us of what classical economics cared about, and
what the goal of economics should be even today: not just understanding how production
works, but also describing how the organization of production could be improved to
allow for less demanding, boring, or dangerous work and more satisfying time—both at
leisure and at work that is gratifying, useful, and safe. While not so specific, this has been
expressed before:
If it were not for the hope that a scientific study of men’s social actions
may lead, not necessarily directly or immediately, but at some time and in
some way, to practical results in social improvement, not a few students of
these actions would regard the time devoted to their study as time
misspent (A.C. Pigou 1932, cited in Bowles et al. 1993).
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In the modern era, neoclassical economists who strive to understand the
mechanisms of capitalist production seem to have adopted “efficiency” as a disembodied
goal, a standard by which to measure both the organization of production and that of the
society as a whole—as though the quality and usefulness of product, the distribution of
social wealth, the quality of work life, and the hours and quality of leisure were somehow
irrelevant to economic analysis—despite the fact that our most precious resource is our
own 24 hours a day.
The study of alternative forms of firm ownership and control, then, is an attempt
to ask whether other ways to organize production may provide for better selection of
products, better distribution of social wealth, better quality of work life, and more
leisure—“efficiency” (in the limited neoclassical use) aside. While this is clearly an
insurmountable order for one piece of research, it is important to acknowledge these
questions in order to make it clear why subsidiary questions are worth asking.
On the other hand, Perelman (2000) points out that even looking just at narrowly
defined efficiency (which I take to mean minimal use of limited resources to produce
maximal useful product),  there is strong evidence that capitalist firms, even given close
competition, operate far from a theoretical optimum.  Harvey Leibenstein (1966, cited in
Perelman 2000) pointed out that competitor plants in near proximity, using similar
technology, often had wide differences in productivity, yet survived; he hypothesized an
unknown source (an “x-factor”) of inefficiency that is built into any organizational
structure. On a macroeconomic level, aggregate organizational inefficiency could easily
outweigh unemployment and allocational inefficiency in keeping the economy from its
potential output (Vanek 1989, p.93, cited in Perelman 2000).
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In the United States, David Gordon (1996, cited in Perelman 2000, pp.70-71) has
calculated that
[d]epending on the definition, between 15 and 20 percent of private non-
farm employees in the United States work as managers and supervisors. In
1994 we spent $1.3 trillion on the salaries and benefits of nonproduction
and supervisory workers, almost one-fifth of total gross domestic
product….
According to Gordon, only Canada (at 12.9%) came close to the 13.0% share of all non-
farm employees in managerial and administrative positions in the U.S. in 1994; the next
closest was Norway, with 6.8% (data were not available for the U.K., France, or Italy);
these differences persisted when he controlled for type of industry. Adding in the
possibility that “intensive monitoring can be self-defeating, encouraging perfunctory,
rather than cooperative behavior” (Perelman 2000, p.71), how much waste is engendered
by the monitoring U.S. workers are subject to?
Is it possible that, despite all the theoretical justifications for hierarchical firm
management, these hierarchies create intrinsic inefficiencies? In the past century, there
has been a tremendous expansion of firm bureaucracies (levels of management above
production supervision) that may well be a large part of any “x-factor.” This expansion
aside, is it possible that large, hierarchical firms create or fertilize a tendency to “shirk,”2
no matter the intensity of supervision? Adam Smith (1776) noted that division of labor
under competitive capitalism can enhance productivity (and thus the social product);
It is naturally to be expected … that some one or other of those who are
employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier
                                                 
2 I use quotation marks here to note that this is a value-laden word, but will drop them for
readability for the rest of the text. Those of us who have worked at alienated labor might
refer to this as strategic withholding of one’s maximum effort to conserve one’s strength
and sanity—and to enhance job security and bargaining leverage for the workforce as a
whole.
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and readier methods of performing their own particular work, wherever
the nature of it admits of such improvement (Book I, chaper 1).
But if the increased value from improvements in production processes are captured by
firm owners (as traditionally understood), is it any wonder that suggestion boxes are
empty? That the very people who know the most about the real issues at the point of
production quickly learn not to share that knowledge with superiors?
 Thus the issue of productive efficiency, even narrowly defined and separated
from the questions of social allocation, is worthy of study at this level. For if more
democratic structures of production are intrinsically more productive, the greater
surpluses from those forms of production can be allocated by worker-owners toward their
own greater leisure, as well as toward general improvements in quality of work life.3 And
even if democratic workplaces are no more productive than hierarchical firms, the
inherent improvements in quality of work life would have clear social benefits.
Our history has led to a pattern of firm organization in which financial investors
hire managers (or entrepreneurs seek investors, who then install managers) who, in turn,
hire workers; the residual (net profit) belongs to the investor-owners. But nothing in the
theory of the firm favors this prevalence of capital hiring labor; Paul Samuelson (1987)
notes that “in the competitive model it makes no difference whether capital hires labor or
the other way around.” Sherwin Rosen (1993), citing Shavell, notes that “ownership
internalizes conflicts of interest over maintenance and reckless use of equipment, which
surely is the most important reason why most capital goods are owned outright [rather
                                                 
3 The pure form of industrial democracy is the producer’s cooperative, a structure that has
been seen as the ideal by both utopian and socialist dreamers for centuries. This is my
interest as well, but the limited number and size of such firms in the modern U.S. has
made it impossible for them to be the subject of this research.
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than leased] by the firms that employ them.” Dow (2003, p.166) cites Holmstrom and
Milgrom’s (1991) suggestion that “If the individuals using an asset do not own it, they
may have weak incentives to maintain it properly or avoid its misuse ….” He goes on to
note that “By a logical extension of their argument, it might appear that large indivisible
assets such as oil refineries and steel mills should be owned jointly by the production
teams using them, because worker-owners would be in the best position to monitor how
physical assets are used.” (Dow 2003, p.167) To the expected criticism that free-ridership
could undermine the viability of such a commons, Dow argues that “…small to medium-
sized production teams might find ways to handle these dilemmas…; small-scale
communities can often resolve such collective-action problems through suitable
institutions.” This inherent conflict of interest over asset maintenance, especially when
output volume is the signal for reward, may be minimized, then, if the very people who
use the equipment own it, rather than the “bosses” with whom they have ongoing tension
over shares of the surplus.
According to the most common theory, firms (and “employment”) exist because
of the need to avoid costly frequent renegotiation of employment contracts, because of
the efficiencies gained through development of internal mechanisms of allocation that
respond flexibly and on command to the needs of final production, and because of the
efficiencies gained through developing and maintaining the culture (my word) of specific
production arrangements—knowledge of technique and timing, of personnel allocations,
and of finance, factor, and sales markets (Coase, 1937). I would point out that much of
6
this array of knowledge is held and transmitted by non-management workers in today’s
traditional (financial investor4-owned) firms.
There has long been a tension between managers of such traditional firms
(hereafter KO firms, for capital-owned) and non-management workers (hereafter
“workers,” ignoring for convenience that managers may formally be employees as well).
Managers, as agents of the owners, try to maximize profit, and hence to extract maximum
work effort from workers. Workers, while they may desire their firm to succeed and
survive, may desire to minimize work effort, both in intensity and in extent (that is, work
effort per hour and number of hours worked); this is the standard assumption in labor
economics about their utility function.5 More intense supervision (assuming observable
work effort—increasingly less prevalent in today’s forms of production) brings with it the
creative resistance that exacerbates this conflict. Perelman (2000, p.69) suggests that “in
the course of these epic struggles between labor and capital, a considerable … amount of
the resources directly devoted to the production of goods and services waste away.” But I
agree with him that “the greatest loss … is the failure to take advantage of and to nurture
the skills, and even more so the creativity of the unappreciated people who toil to supply
us with the goods and services that make up our standard of living” (p.69).
Much human resource management literature and energy is devoted to resolving
this conflict in favor of KO firm management, especially in refusing to yield total control
of employment conditions to “outside” parties (that is, unions). Thus one dimension on
which labor ownership and management may be preferable is in reducing or eliminating
                                                 
4 The reason for qualifying “investor” by “financial” will become apparent below.
5 I would add satisfaction with work process and product—one might say “quality of
work life”—as an argument in workers’ utility function; one might also add approval by
coworkers, especially in long-term, stable work groups.
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this conflict: if workers collectively retain the residual, they may be able to decide what
level of work effort (and hours) maximizes their joint utility of profit and “leisure”
(inclusive of “reduced effort”), as well as how to make the work itself more satisfying.
While this decision-making process does not guarantee compliance (that is, neither
shirking nor absenteeism is automatically avoided, especially in firms where large size
makes the decision-making process less participatory), it at least eliminates the inherent
conflicts of interest that underlie management-worker conflict in KO firms.
Secondly, if we assume that productivity improvements are of social benefit
(holding aside the question of allocation of that benefit to financial investors or to
workers—or neither), we need to note that workers in KO firms, while they are naturally
creative about such improvements, are commonly aware that (1) they will probably not
benefit directly from suggested innovations, except perhaps by token recognition; and
that (2) such innovations, if successful in reducing worker-hours needed, may in fact
jeopardize their own jobs or those of their coworkers. In a worker-owned firm, however,
in which (as noted above) ease of work and quality of work are recognized as firm goals,
and employment stability is an established norm,6 workers’ and the firms’ motivations for
improved productivity would be aligned; while there may still be only token recognition
for the suggestion, there will no longer be the threat of a severe cost.
Third, I would argue that most workers have a strong desire to control their work
process. The world-wide prevalence of small proprietorships in the face of tremendous
                                                 
6 Worker-owned and -managed firms have been shown to adjust hours rather than
employment in response to business cycles or other market changes. See, for example,
Craig and Pencavel (1992): “…when reductions in labor costs are called for, the
cooperatives are inclined to protect employment and tolerate more moderate wage
increases, if not cuts in earnings, than conventional firms…”, p.1089.
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odds against their (even short-term) success is strong evidence of this, as is the demand
for land tenure (rather than farming for hire) in much of the still-agricultural world.
While industrial democracy does not give individual control to each worker, I would
argue that, at least in smaller firms in which there can still be a sense of collectivity (that
is, workers can feel the firm is “us”), this desire for work-process control can be met
under employee ownership, reducing further the tension between the worker’s and the
firm’s objectives, and providing structures that allow and encourage workers to share and
implement their wealth of energy and ideas.
Fourth—and here let me reduce the universe to the United States—I would argue
that there cannot be civic democracy without substantial industrial democracy.7 True
democracy requires the active participation—not just voting—by broad segments of the
polity. Workers whose work lives are spent in alienated work, directed entirely by others
and constrained against any creative inputs, are essentially trained not to have such inputs
into their communities, nor do they often have the energy or time to participate in these
ways; especially in a society in which household is most commonly just nuclear family,
childcare and household tasks overwhelm any “leisure” hours. Both by involving workers
in participatory decision-making in the work process, and by accepting reduced work
effort and work hours as part of the firm’s maximand, industrial democracy can
encourage and build political democracy outside of the workplace (see, for example,
Smith 1985).
                                                 
7 I have had some of these ideas so long that I cannot source them. But Bowles and Gintis
(1996) express very similar ideas, especially pp.75 ff. Dow (2003) provides a review of
the literature on the connections between workplace and civic democracy in section 2.3,
pp.27-32. An extensive argument is found in Dahl (1985).
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Neo-classical economics treats workers as interchangeable parts; “labor” is just
another factor in production. But Marxian theory aside, workers are not lumber or
machines. Workers have a natural human tendency to develop social networks at work, to
value continuity of employment (even if the work itself is alienating or ill-paid), to
identify with employers. Our work effort is not just another input; it is a piece of
ourselves, an irreplaceable number of calories and hours and brain power that—while it
may be motivated by the need to earn a paycheck and retain continued employment—is
in another view a form of investment in the firm’s success and survival, even if only
because that makes our continued employment more secure. Further, this investment
(let’s call it “labor investment”) is of far more importance to its donor than money
invested is to financial investors. Unlike equity, it is not fungible or impersonal—it is,
conceptually if not always actually, blood and sweat—and a wage that (supposedly)
reflects instant marginal productivity rather than the long-term value of the worker’s
efforts cannot be an adequate return. In a real sense, workers, not financial investors, are
the firm; is there then any logic to imputing “ownership” solely to financial investors, or
to insisting through law that firms’ primary duties must be enhancing those investors’
values?
Much literature focuses on aligning incentives. But looking only at the firm’s
incentives is too narrow a focus. Corporations were created because governments (at first,
monarchs) saw advantages to allowing private finance to make investments that might
wind up enriching public (or royal) wealth. Their existence today—that is, the existence
of institutions of production that have most of the legal protections of individuals (and
often favored tax treatment)—can be justified only insofar as they contribute to social
10
well-being. Publicly held firms have perverse incentives on several dimensions of social
well-being, which I would argue might be reduced or eliminated under worker
ownership: (1) they have incentives to produce and promote products that will soon need
to be replaced (in the case of computers, for example, new software turns out to require
new  hardware); (2) they focus on small differentials such as branding rather than on true
innovation (think automobiles); (3) environmental damage, both in production and
excessive packaging, is externalized; and (4) maltreatment of workers in productivity
pressures, safety failures, and alienation (that is, making the work as unsatisfying as
possible through Taylorization, etc.), can be rewarded by higher profits (or higher stock
values), even though such rigidity limits creativity and potential for firm innovation that
may have longer-term positive social (and firm!) value. While there are no guarantees
that worker ownership would eliminate these social damages (even better working
conditions are not guaranteed), I would argue that there is far more alignment of
incentives between firms and society at large when firms are owned by people who are a
direct, everyday presence, a part of the local community, and who must directly bear the
consequences of the firms’ production decisions. Even in a competitive economy,
employee-owners are not likely to outsource their jobs to Malaysia, nor to create
hazardous waste sites in their communities.
Because of all the standard assumptions about the efficiency rationales for
financial investors owning firms, it is necessary to ask whether ownership by employees
might be just as (if not more) viable a way to organize production under modern
capitalism. This project is a piece of trying to answer that question.
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Chapter 1: The firm, ownership, and incentive alignment
The firm
Ronald Coase (1937) said that a firm “consists of the system of relationships
which come into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur” (Coase, in Williamson and Winter, p.22). But the discussion that leads up
to that summary does not in fact require an entrepreneur as we understand the term—only
that there be some person or group who does manage the enterprise; that could as well be
the collective will of the participants in the enterprise. So I will recast Coase’s core
observation in a preliminary definition:
A firm (enterprise, company) is a collection of individuals who engage in shared
production. Some individual or group of individuals has the authority to manage
production and external (market) transactions. Internal transactions (the allocation of
resources within) are incompletely contracted, and occur in a non-market environment
under the management’s direction, with a range of possible levels of shared control and
renegotiation of these contracts among the participants.
Coase argued that firms emerge in situations in which there would be substantial
costs of repeatedly going to the market for new factors, making contracts for those
factors, and in particular determining prices for those factors. It is clear8 that it is labor
that has the indeterminate price, since material factors are likely to be market-priced and
readily contracted for in a clear and insurable way (that is, providers take responsibility
for quality). But the quality and quantity of labor are far less clearly evaluated in the
                                                 
8 “[Lack of specificity in the contracting of factors] is obviously of more importance in
the case of services—labor—than it is in the buying of commodities” (Coase, in
Williamson and Winter, pp.21-22).
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market, and come with no guarantees. So rather than repeatedly going to a hiring hall,
bargaining with “human factors” over a wage (with no guarantees of output quantity or
quality), and renting a day’s worth of labor power9 ad hoc, the management of the firm
enters into a longer-term (perhaps indefinite) hiring contract “whereby the factor, for a
certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of
an entrepreneur within certain limits [emphasis in original; the existence of limits is made
explicit to exclude slavery]” (Coase, in Williamson and Winter, p.21). Thus the firm
amasses enough labor power, working together under the direction of management, to
turn its other factors into products.
H.B. Malmgren (1961, p.403) adds stability as a motivation for the existence of
firms:
[w]here fluctuations in demand, or in the time required for supply, or both
are important the firm can consolidate production and carry the necessary
average level of idle capacity to achieve long-term stability in production
and price, … [in turn reducing] the cost of finding and making
transactions.
According to these observers, then, firms exist because having a management that brings
workers under a single “roof” to produce together, with open contracts that allow
reallocation of labor power as needed, and enabling the enterprise to have a longer
planning horizon, minimizes transaction costs and adds to productive efficiency and
stability. In turn, the price stability and quantity flexibility provided by these
organizations grease the wheels of the whole economy.
                                                 
9 I make the Marxian distinctions: one cannot rent labor, but only people’s labor power.
And one can only rent it, since purchasing it suggests it is separable from the worker.
These distinctions are not critical to the discussion here, and I will not expand on them.
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Brian Loasby adds a further dimension to the rationale for the existence of firms.
He argues that many circumstances affecting factor prices and production methods are
unknowable (even in principle) a priori, and that “the organisation of this adaptive
process … provides the function for management.” (Loasby 1976, p.65) Firms are almost
organic [my analogy] institutions which, “instead of attempting to establish contingent
claims markets in situations where the necessary complete listing of possibilities cannot
be achieved, … organise subassemblies [of people and resources] within the economy to
encourage the ongoing search for knowledge, and the effective transfer of new
technology”(p. 70). This is not just avoidance of uncertainty, but avoidance of “the
logically infinite costs of creating a system of contingent claims markets when there is no
way of knowing when the search for a complete listing [of possible future states] has
reached its goal” (pp. 70-71). He agrees with Coase that the firm “offers a possible
substitute for the market system when the information required for the working of that
system is costly to acquire and use,” but notes that this “argument becomes even stronger
when we recognise that some of that information cannot exist” (p. 78).
For Loasby (1976, chapter 4), the incomplete contracts specified by firms are but
one piece of a general state of ignorance about the future; not only is the distribution of
future states unknown, but it cannot be known. The firm is an adaptive mechanism that
gathers experience, enabling it to decide ad hoc how to proceed as situations (supply
availabilities and prices, labor markets, personnel, consumer demand, technologies,
regulations) change. Accepting this critique, I would modify my working definition:
A firm (enterprise) is a collection of individuals who engage in shared
production, and which is structured to adapt as needed to external and
internal changes. Some individual or group has the authority to manage
production and external (market) transactions. Internal transactions (the
14
allocation of resources and tasks within) are incompletely contracted, and
occur in a non-market environment under the management’s direction,
with a range of possible levels of shared control and renegotiation of these
contracts among the participants. Knowledge is accumulated and used to
evaluate alternative reactions to changes such as in supply availabilities
and prices, labor markets, personnel, consumer demand, technologies, and
regulations.
But I would note that this abstraction still ignores the fact that the experience thus
gained is embodied in the people who work at the firm, and that effective evaluation and
implementation of such changes requires the enthusiastic participation of those workers. I
would posit that firm ownership and control by workers is one way to elicit that
enthusiasm. Further, I would argue that the supposed dangers of free-ridership in such
collective endeavors are far smaller than the dangers (to productivity and creative
problem-solving, as well as to human bodies and psyches) of alienation of work in
hierarchical KO firms.
Firm ownership
Gregory Dow (2003) modifies Coase’s definition; Dow’s firm is
a set of agents supplying inputs to a common production process, where
the productive activities of the agents are coordinated through an authority
structure and the resulting outputs are sold on a market. Inputs may
include labor, physical assets, financial wealth, raw materials, land, or any
other resource that can be owned by an individual or group (p.92).10
Authority and compliance issues within a firm are focused on compliance by labor;
defective or otherwise unsatisfactory purchased material inputs can be sent back to a
supplier, subject to common law and the discipline of the market. It is the power of some
                                                 
10 Dow includes “sold on a market” in order to exclude household production for
household consumption.
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agent(s) to describe and delimit labor’s tasks, subject ultimately to the threat of firing for
non-compliance, that makes a collection of workers into a firm.
But one must then ask where that authority is vested. While various intermediary
models may exist, Dow contrasts pure control by financial investors (the capital-managed
firm) with pure control by productive11 workers (the labor-managed firm), and concludes
that there is nothing in the theory of the firm to explain why most corporations today are
controlled by financial investors. In fact,  “[a]ny allocation of resources that can be
supported by firms having an outside asset owner or ‘principal’ can also be supported by
firms where worker teams own assets jointly and no principal exists” (p.134, citing Dow,
2000).
Dow thoroughly explores the question of why capital controls most firms, and
argues that there is no basis for concluding that the answer is one of greater efficiency.
Rather, “differences in alienability affect control rights in firms [emphasis added]” (Dow,
2003, p.236). The fact that labor cannot be separated from the person who performs it,
while capital can be exchanged (alienated), matters in several ways.12 First, worker-
owners are perceived (by potential lenders) to have shorter time horizons than investor-
owners, and may over-depreciate their equipment or pursue risky projects in pursuit of
short-term gain; thus potential lenders and investors have little confidence in repayment,
and EO firms have less opportunity for investment and credit. Second, if control is vested
in a substantial number of worker-owners, the controlling group is thereby much larger
than an investor-selected board of directors (or individual CEO); thus there may be
                                                 
11 “Productive” is used here to clarify that Dow does not mean to include such structures
as limited partnerships with large subordinate staffs.
12 The following arguments are from Dow, 2003, pp.236-240.
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additional transaction costs (delays, reversals of policy) traceable to the larger number of
participants. Third, even though there may be markets for membership in a worker-
owned firm, the essential identity between membership and employment suggests that
such markets would likely function less efficiently than markets for shares of capital
ownership. Employee-owned firms might fail to expand employment as needed (because
of unwillingness to dilute the value of incumbents’ shares of fixed assets) or succumb to
outside buyers’ bids to buy them out; the transition from employee ownership to investor
ownership would be much less challenging than the reverse, with its accompanying
financing problems. And if membership markets fail to fully value membership rights,
that failure would encourage the supposed short-sightedness that limits financing
options.13
Pagano and Rowthorn (1996a) add an extremely valuable insight on path-
dependence to Dow’s suggestions. Essentially, they say that the predominance of capital-
owned firms creates a superstructure that reinforces that predominance:
First, the self-reinforcing nature of a given organizational equilibrium
inhibits gradual evolution through piecemeal mutations in property rights
or technology…. Secondly, the efficiency of each organizational
equilibrium is itself dependent on the frequency of other types of
organizational equilibrium. The joint consequence of these objections is
that, instead of a simple efficiency story based on market ‘selection,’ there
will be a process of cumulative causation between property rights and
technology which is such that alternative, and potentially more efficien[t]
combinations, may never have the chance to develop (p.117).
These challenges to the usual assumption that the infrequency of employee ownership
proves that EO firms must be less efficient than KO firms demonstrate the need for
empirical tests of that hypothesis.
                                                 
13 This last point is my own addition to these hypotheses.
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Incentive alignment and monitoring
A sole producer-proprietor has a clear interest in the productivity of her
enterprise: the more she can produce (assuming a stable price above costs), the more she
earns from her work. But the establishment of shared production in a firm creates a new
set of problems: if production is truly shared (as opposed, for example, to piecework
establishments), and output is thus not linked to a particular worker, what is any worker’s
incentive to carry his share, both in quantity of work done and quality of the produced
output? Sherwin Rosen points out (1993, p.82) that as firms grow in complexity, costs of
directly monitoring work grow prohibitively. Absent direct monitoring, and assuming
that workers are (at least occasionally) loath to exert effort, how can management avoid
shirking? Gross malfeasance, if discovered, can always be penalized by separation; in a
labor market with substantial unemployment (and incomplete unemployment insurance)
this can be a significant threat, especially if reputation affects future employability. But
how does management minimize less dramatic deviations from the firm’s expectations?
As far back as the early 20th century, “social harmonizers” thought that the tension
between labor (trying to minimize work effort) and capital (trying to maximize profit)
could be ameliorated by giving workers a share of firm profits.
There can be no doubt that the soundest possible solution of the labour
question will eventually be found in such a modification of the terms of
partnership as shall bind the interests of the employer and worker more
closely together. Under such a system the weekly wages would be
regarded merely as subsistence money or advances …. The balance …
would be paid (as) a share of all surplus profits [ellipses in citation]
(Jevons, 1910).
This classic solution to aligning incentives (when piece-work is not viable
because output is not ascribable to individuals) has had a long and varied history. In the
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early 20th century, while there were a number of large firms with profit-sharing plans,
these did not cover most workers, and were “seen primarily as a form of executive
compensation” (Mitchell et al. 1990, p.35). As of 1986, 22% of the full-time workforce in
medium and large firms had some form of profit-sharing (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1987, p.81). But given its irregular history, and the fact that there is seldom immediacy or
transparency to rewards, there has been little consensus that profit-sharing is an effective
incentive.
Another answer to the question of motivating work effort, and one which further
modifies the definition of the firm, is by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). While they do not
disagree with Coase’s formulation regarding a priori wage indeterminacy, they focus on
the issue of work incentives. Team production, in which joint effort creates output greater
than would be produced by the sum of separate individual efforts, is assumed; why else
have labor work together? But this makes it impossible to measure individual work effort
simply by observing team output; such measurement—if attempted at all—becomes very
costly: “measuring marginal productivity and making payments in accord therewith is
more expensive by an order of magnitude than for separable production functions”
(Alchian and Demsetz, p.779). Assuming that workers enjoy leisure (exerting less work
effort, as well as less work time), and given that the cost to each worker (in reduced
compensation for the team’s reduced output) of shirking is only 1/N of the team’s lost
marginal product value, “each input owner will have more incentive to shirk when he
works as part of a team, than if his performance could be monitored easily or if he did not
work as [part of] a team” (p.780). And the 1/N effect limits incentives for coworker
monitoring as well;
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so long as there are costs for other people [in the team] to detect this shift
toward relaxation, it will not pay (them) to force him to readjust
completely by making him realize the true cost…; [the result will be] a
lower rate of productive effort and more shirking than in a costless
monitoring, or measuring, world (p.780).
Alchian and Demsetz suggest that having a specialized monitor may begin to
solve the problem of evaluating (and enforcing) worker performance. But to create a
correct incentive for proper monitoring, “give [the monitor] title to the net earnings of the
team, net of payments to other inputs” (p.782)—that is, the residual. “The monitor earns
his residual through the reduction in shirking that he brings about … by observing and
directing the actions or uses of these inputs [i.e., workers]” (p.782). The monitor must be
able to alter or cancel the employees’ contracts based on his observations, since otherwise
there is no enforcement effect. They then use this arrangement as part of their definition
of the “classical capitalist firm:”
… the contractual organization of inputs … with (a) joint input
production, (b) several input owners [workers], (c) one party who is
common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to
renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with other
input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the right to
sell his central contractual residual status (p.783).
Edward Lazear  (1979) suggested that private pensions were an effort to create an
incentive for proper work effort: the worker received only part of her marginal product in
the wage, and the rest would be returned later in her career, dependent on not being fired
in the interim for poor work. A similar logic can explain tenure-related wage increases in
many work contracts: a worker is paid less than marginal product value early on, in the
expectation that she will recoup the loss later if her work remains satisfactory.
Even if such a bond (that is, an implicit promise by the worker backed by
anticipation of pay gain) were to be very high, however, it would still only be effective if
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there is some type of monitoring which can either measure effort, or observe some
behavior that is presumed to be correlated with effort. Further, Alchian and Demsetz’s
formulation seems to me only to beg the question: if work effort is no longer measurable
because of team production, how does assigning a monitor lead to the ability to motivate
workers to do any more than satisfy that monitor’s immediate expectations? The more
intrusive and punitive that monitoring, creating immediate incentives to comply, the more
incentive there is for workers to do no more than required to keep their jobs;14 true
investment by workers—such as creative modifications and knowledge-sharing—is never
attained.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) develop a model in which multi-tasking by
agents is the key to incentive issues. Either the principal “has several different tasks for
the agent or agents to perform, or the agent’s single task has several dimensions to it”
(p.25).  In the context of the employment relationship under costly monitoring, then, even
a single task for a worker in which quantity of output might compete with quality of
output fits such a model. Under these circumstances, “a system of piece rates for output
may lead agents [workers] to increase the volume of output at the expense of quality”
(p.25). In general, in setting incentives, the principal must take into account the fact that
“incentive pay … serves to direct the allocation of the agents’ attention among their
various duties” (p.25), and must therefore be careful in providing incentives for readily
measurable activities when the competing activities—e.g., quality of output or good
maintenance of capital assets—are of value to the principal. This model leads directly to
                                                 
14 Thus the “working stupid” and work-to-rule campaigns suggested by worker advocates
responding to intensive work pressures during the 1970s and 1980s; for current examples,
see Slaughter (2005), esp. pages 67 and 132-133.
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a reflection on asset ownership: if good maintenance of the productive asset is important
and not readily measured, either “only muted” incentives should be provided for quantity
of output (assuming the asset is owned by the principal), to protect the asset from abuse,
or ownership should be vested in the agent [worker]—who will then have incentives to
maintain it—but strong incentives for quantity should be implemented to prevent too-
cautious use (p.26). These authors show (seemingly successfully) that the general
predictions of this model as to when explicit incentives should be offered are validated in
common business practice.
Efficiency wages
Many observers have noted that, in highly capital-intensive industries, workers
are paid more than workers with comparable traits in more labor-intensive industries;
these apparent discrepancies are collectively called “efficiency wages.” In their incisive
paper describing these phenomena, Krueger and Summers (1988) effectively demolish
explanations for these inter-industry wage differentials such as unmeasured labor quality,
union effects, and compensating differentials, and argue that these differentials amount to
a rent to induce workers to better performance. “[H]igh wages are efficacious in reducing
turnover” (p.260), thus reducing search and training costs to employers. Efficiency wages
may raise work effort by increasing the expected cost to workers of job loss, given
workers’ limited information about external employment possibilities (but note that as
with Lazear’s suggested role for pensions, this rationale still requires that there be some
level of monitoring that can ascertain the acceptability of each individual’s work efforts).
Krueger and Summers add another possible explanation for the above-market wages: that
“firms which pay higher wages will find that they attract a higher quality pool of
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applicants”—a selection effect rather than one of adjusting incentives. In any case, the
difficulties of monitoring play a central role in making such above-market wages cost-
effective;
…when there are differences in their ability to … supervise and monitor
their workers, or to measure labor quality … because of differences in the
technology of production, then the optimal wage to pay will vary (p.261).
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and others explain observed higher wages in more
capital-intensive industries as “efficiency wages,” designed to elicit effort by increasing
the expected cost of dismissal, especially as work effort is not readily measurable. As
explained by Pohjola (1993, p.151),
… the modern production system requires effort which is hard to quantify.
What is required from the workers is their ability to deal with changes
occurring on the shop floor as well as to treat problems and prevent errors
in the production process. Not all of this is routine work which can be
standardized and measured. At least some tacit knowledge of the
production process is required. Effort can … be interpreted as the intensity
with which the worker uses his … knowledge of the system of production.
The profound problem facing firm management, then, is how to guarantee maximum,
consistent work effort while not stifling workers’ creative energies. I am suggesting here
that this dilemma may not be solvable under capital-ownership.
Employee ownership and incentive alignment
As production becomes more complex, and individual output less measurable,
industrial theory needs to address whether a new paradigm is in order. Intensive
monitoring with potential punishment may not work to motivate work effort and
creativity. Aligning incentives in firms where effective production demands employees’
creative—even enthusiastic—input may require more than some tweaking of HR
policies. Applebaum and Berg (2000) observe that modern production technology has
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enabled manufacturing firms to be highly attuned to quality control, flexible (rapidly
adjusting product design to meet customers’ changing demands), and better able to
provide “just-in-time” production for customers, reducing inventory-related costs. They
argue that all these changes require better-trained production workers, and that some of
the decision-making previously vested in supervisors must be devolved to horizontal
interactions among shop-floor workers. “… [C]oordination and communication among
workers to solve problems and regulate production assume a key role. Firms tend to
foster communication and coordination by adopting human resources and industrial
relations practices that encourage and reward these coordination and problem-solving
activities by front-line workers…” (p.107). Any time taken from direct production work
for horizontal consultation is compensated for by reducing inventory, improving quality,
prompt satisfaction of customer needs, and solving production snags as they arise. While
in some cases the horizontal-coordination effect on productivity may be small or zero,
“[t]he real payoff to companies … comes on the revenue side of the equation as
companies that consistently deliver perfect quality products in a timely fashion develop
long-term relationships with their customers...” (p.114). Front-line workers use the
hands-on information they have to yield these values; “[i]n all of these situations, the
information rents are positive,” and Applebaum and Berg go on to raise the question of
whether workers in these situations should have guarantees of capturing some of the
returns on their human capital investments. They speculate that workers’ extensive
investment in firm-specific human capital may need to be compensated by “[e]nforceable
rights to employee participation in corporate governance [that would]… safeguard the
continuity of the employment relationship” (p.118).
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And Brian Loasby (1976) underlines the need to give employees more latitude if
their knowledge is to be useful to the firm:
…subordinates have a good deal of control over the information which
their superiors use, including the information by which they are judged….
Neither the target nor the performance recorded in a control system
necessarily represents reality; on the contrary, all formal control systems
may be expected to generate misinformation (pp.138-139).
While participation in firm governance (though highly unlikely in an industrial
regime that resists even shareholder initiative) might lead to protections for workers’
human-capital investments, might not worker ownership provide a more intuitive
framework?  The usual response to this question is to raise the issue of work discipline:
even if most workers understand their ownership and care about outcomes, what about
free-riders?
Weitzman and Kruse (1990) respond to the free-rider objections to profit-sharing
as a viable incentive broached in Alchian and Demsetz (and by many other theorists).
They argue that in repeated games with full information (as would be the case with long-
term employment in a relatively consistent work environment), there is a cooperative
equilibrium in which all gain (though modestly) from each employee’s increasing work
effort, though there is no guarantee that this equilibrium would be achieved;15 this result
would apply as well to employee ownership. Alchian and Demsetz, in their discussion of
firm structures other than the classical capitalist one, note that while pure profit-sharing
                                                 
15 But note that stable employment groups within firms develop cultures; it is not hard to
posit cultures in which the expectation of some satisfactory level of effort is transmitted
from senior employees (or natural leaders) to others, with social sanctions as
enforcement, thus making achievement of the cooperative equilibrium much more likely.
See, for example, Winther and Marens (1997), pp.400-401: “…members of a collective
may anticipate mutual monitoring based on social norms for work behaviour in peer
groups and that[,] combined with significant degrees of ownership[,] could have a
preponderous influence on performance.”
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suffers from the same potential misalignment of incentives as does the unmonitored team,
teams with small numbers of members may effectively self-monitor; for smaller teams,
“monitoring need not be entirely specialized” (p.786). And they acknowledge the
possibility that “team spirit” (which I would argue is essentially the cultural standard
suggested in the note below) might discourage shirking and make team production more
efficient (p.790). Appelbaum and Berg (2000, p.135) observed that with even a small
share of workers’ compensation linked to firm performance, workers seemed to
“contribut[e] discretionary effort to improv[e] efficiency and quality.” They speculated
that “[i]t is the recognition of workers as stakeholders in the firm, and not the size of the
incentive, that is significant and that provides incentives for workers to expend
appropriate levels of discretionary effort” (p. 135). And, in reporting on results of a
recent survey of workers at over 300 work locations,  Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi (2007)
find that ownership cultures can reduce shirking;
“shared capitalist” arrangements—defined broadly as those in which firms
share rewards and decision-making with workers—and positive labor
relations encourage workers to act against shirking behavior and thus
strengthen the potential for group incentive systems and team production
to overcome the free rider problem….16
Given relatively stable attachment between worker and work group, then,
employee ownership includes the possibility of non-hierarchically-enforced norms of
production (read “effort”) that can not only allow but even encourage the creativity and
enthusiasm for work needed in modern production contexts; “efficiency” need not suffer.
Employee ownership, at least theoretically, provides the opportunity to ameliorate many
of the contradictions suggested in the introduction between workers’ lives at work and
                                                 
16 This study reported that anti-shirking behavior is, as expected, strongest  in smaller
firms.
26
their status in the community at large. What remains is to ask some empirical questions
about its viability: where employee ownership exists, do firm outcomes differ?
27
Chapter 2: Employee Ownership Stock Plans (ESOPs)
In order to study the effects of employee ownership in the U.S., I have turned to
the largest group of firms for which employee ownership is a credible description, those
in which a substantial portion of corporate value is held by an Employee Stock
Ownership Trust under the provisions of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan, or ESOP.
As of the latest available estimates, there are about 9,800 ESOPs, stock bonus plans, and
profit-sharing plans primarily invested in employer stock, with over 11 million employee
participants, and holding assets of over $900 billion (National Center for Employee
Ownership [NCEO] 2008). While the NCEO asserts that these other incentive plans are
similar to ESOPs, I find that assertion somewhat weak, since I am concerned with forms
of ownership in which workers have a strong enough share of firm value to credibly have
a sense of ownership, and in which there is at least the possibility of substantial worker
input into firm management.
Looking at profit-sharing, gain-sharing, and stock options, a 2006 survey found
that 46.7% of private-sector employees participated in at least one of these forms of
capital ownership.17 An earlier analysis of federal benefit plan reports (Form 5500) by
Kruse (2002, reporting on 1998 data) showed that there were over 2,000 large (over 100
participants) “non-401(k)” ESOP plans, with total participation by over 3 million
employees, and total plan assets of nearly $70 billion, of which $54 billion was in
employer stock, for an average of $17,000 in employer stock per participant. Because
such plans hold much higher shares of their assets (77.1% on average, compared to
                                                 
17 Data from the 2006 General Social Survey, administered by the National Opinion
Research Center, University of Chicago, and provided to me by Prof. Joseph Blasi of
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.
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401(k) ESOP plans, with 39.0% on average) (Kruse 2002, Table 1) as employer stock
than any other type of employee ownership plan, it is these I will focus on.
Employee stock ownership plans [ESOPs] are defined in sections 401(A)
and 4975(E)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code and in section 407(D)(6) of
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA). These and
all other federal laws mentioning ESOPs treat them as employee benefit
plans. However, the original promoters of ESOPs did not intend them to
serve primarily as such. The 1976 annual report of the Joint Economic
Committee described the intended purposes of ESOP incentives as
follows: “to provide a realistic opportunity for more U.S. citizens to
become owners of capital, and to provide an expanded source of equity
financing for corporations.” (U.S. Congress 1976a, p.100).
A subsequent congressional report acknowledged that “ESOPs share
certain characteristics with other employee benefit plans—profit sharing,
thrift and savings, and stock purchase or bonus plans.” [U.S. Congress
1976b, p.4]  But the differences between ESOPs and other employee
benefit plans were again stressed, particularly the potential use of ESOPs
as a technique of corporate finance. The report also stated that ESOPs
“may … [elllipsis in citation] enhance employee motivation which in turn
increases productivity” (Both paragraphs from Conte and Svejnar 1990,
pp.143-144).
Louis Kelso, a banker and corporate attorney, “believed in the annual issuing of
stock to mainly low income families…. As economies become more capital intensive,
reformed institutions are necessary in order to provide households with other sources of
income than labour” (Winther and Marens, p.403). He was the major actor to push
Senator Russell Long to include Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.
The ESOP is a trust, a ‘legal fiction’ designed to hold stock on behalf of
employees until they retire from the firm… Virtually all full-time
employees must be included in any ESOP, with the major exceptions
being unionized workers (who may negotiate to join the plan) and non-
citizens. Stock is usually allocated to each employee on the basis of that
person’s share of total payrolls, though it can be allocated on the basis of
seniority … or, in rare instances, on the principle of equal shares to all
participants. In addition, other rules are in place to ensure that most of the
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benefits do not go to the better paid employees (Winther and Marens,
pp.403-404).
Substantial tax benefits are offered to financial institutions to loan money to
ESOP trusts to purchase shares, and dividends paid to the trust are deductible for tax
purposes if they are used to pay off these loans. Besides the tax and financing advantages,
what distinguishes ESOPs is that unlike any other employee benefit trust, in which
diversification is required by ERISA  to protect employees,  ESOPs by definition hold
most (often all) of their assets in employer stocks.18
Does ESOP participation substitute for other compensation?
Advocates of employee ownership must respond to the argument that total
compensation must be responsive to the labor market, and thus that granting employees
what amounts to a future benefit must come at the cost of other income. But Blasi, Conte,
and Kruse (1996) found that, among public companies in which broad-based employee
ownership plans held at least 5% of company stock as of 1990, there was an 8% higher
average compensation level than at other, comparable public companies.
Kardas, Scharf, and Keogh (1998), using 1995 employment and wage data for
102 ESOP firms and 499 matching firms from the Washington State Employment
Security Department, and benefit data from 1995 IRS forms 5500, concluded that
“employees are significantly better compensated in ESOP companies than are employees
in comparable non-ESOP companies.” And another study comparing pay and benefits
                                                 
18 For a thorough explanation of the legislative history and tax advantages of ESOPs, see
Employee Benefit Research Institute (1988), “Employee stock ownership plans can
enhance corporate performance, but most ESOPs have not been structured to realize their
full potential in this area,” Issue Brief number 74, January, 1988, on line at
http://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=3715.
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between ESOP and non-ESOP firms in Massachusetts found that pay and other benefits
were similar between these two types of firms (Scharf and Mackin, 2000). I have seen no
studies that dispute these conclusions.
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Chapter 3: The empirical literature: effects of employee participation and
ownership
Corey Rosen, the Executive Director of the National Center for Employee
Ownership (and whom I consulted when starting this project), noted, in his Guide to
Doing Academic Research on Employee Ownership, (Rosen, 2007) that major studies
have found “that when employee ownership is combined with a ‘high involvement’
management style, companies perform a great deal better than they would have been
expected to perform otherwise.” This seems to be the consensus in the field, and a fairly
accurate reflection of the research reviewed below. This article also responds to the issue
of whether ownership is given as a substitute for wages or other benefits:
Overall, the data show that ESOPs significantly add wealth to employees,
albeit with substantial variations from one company to another. They also
show that ESOP participants are more likely to have other retirement plans
than comparable non-ESOP participants.
There have been several very thorough reviews of this literature, and this chapter
does not attempt to replicate those. In reporting on the articles in the literature, I omit
those that explicitly and solely deal with cooperatives, firms which are wholly and
directly owned and controlled by all their workers, since these bear little resemblance to
ESOPs, even those which are wholly owned.19
Ownership effects
One of the earliest studies (and most comprehensive, since it used privileged IRS
data) of ESOPs was done by the Government Accounting Office (now the Government
Accountability Office) and released in 1987. Looking at firms that adopted ESOPs from
                                                 
19 Aside from the fact that even in 100% ESOPs workers may have little or no control
over their work, their realization of any share of the residual is long in the future, while
cooperative worker-members make ongoing decisions about how to allocate any residual.
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1974 through 1979, and comparing firm measures for 2 years before and for 3 years after
adoption, the GAO “found that its profitability and productivity measures for firms that
adopted ESOPs did not show consistent, statistically significant patterns of improvement
after the ESOP was established” (GAO p.3). But while such before-and-after analysis
may be the most valid, we must note that the characteristics and size of the U.S. ESOP
sector have changed substantially in the 30 years since the data used here.
Thorardson (1987) compared Swedish worker-owned firms (at least 50% owned
by at least 50% of the workforce) with closely matched traditionally-owned firms from
1976 to 1983 (15 pairs). Return on total capital showed no difference, but both value
added and labor productivity (value added per worker) were significantly higher for the
worker-owned group. Both the EO and KO firms were mostly in small-scale industry,
with relatively high human-capital input and relatively low material capital input, but
within this sector the EO firms had a significantly higher capital-labor ratio. The author
notes that this tendency is consistent with a model of labor-managed firms (LMFs) in
which worker-owners prefer capital investments to expanding the numbers of worker-
owners, although there is no indication in the article as to whether any of the EO firms
were in fact labor-managed.
Another “classic” in this literature was Conte and Svejnar’s 1988 study of total
factor productivity in 40 US firms, comparing profit-sharing companies, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), producer cooperatives (in the plywood industry), and
companies with programs for employee participation but with no profit-sharing or
employee ownership. They found that “profit sharing has a positive effect, although the
coefficient is statistically significant only in [one] specification” (p.146). They argue,
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however, that because “under profit-sharing the extent to which workers have a say over
their own incomes is rather limited[, o]ur results suggest that in companies which have
profit-sharing programs there exist other programs as well under which workers can
influence their own incomes, and it is these programs which lead to productivity gains”
(p.146).
In 1995, Chris Doucouliagos performed what may have been the first meta-
analysis of studies on this topic. He looked at 43 published studies of both worker-
managed firms and “participatory capitalist firms.” “Profit-sharing, worker ownership,
and worker participation in decision-making are all postively associated with
productivity” (p.58), with the associations being stronger among the worker-managed
firms.
A 1996 article by Blasi, Conte and Kruse compared 562 publicly held U.S.
companies that had more than 5% employee-held stock during 1980-1990 with the
balance of publicly held companies on various output and growth measures. While they
found no significant differences between EO and non-EO firms in 1990 levels of return
on assets, return on equity, price/earnings ratio, or profit margin, employee ownership
had significant positive impacts on changes in all of these measures (except P/E) between
1980 and 1990, controlling for employment level and for capital intensity. Further, the
relationship between employee ownership and higher profit growth was strongest among
smaller companies.
More directly relevant to this paper, Winther and Marens (1997) sampled ESOP
and matching non-ESOP firms in New York and Washington states over the period
1987–1991. Their independent variables were: ratio of ESOP participants to total
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employment, percentage of total firm stock owned by the ESOP, and a dummy for
whether ESOP participants held voting rights. Employee participation was quantified
differently for the two sub-samples; in New York, management was asked to rate
employee influence in investment, purchase of tools and equipment, budgets and cost
control, work organization, health and safety, and decisions pertaining to the general
work environment. The responses could be (1) employees had no influence at all; (2)
management’s decisions were communicated to the employees; (3)employees were
encouraged to make suggestions or express opinions; (4) employees’ suggestions were
regarded as equal to management’s and implemented on an equal footing; and (5)
employees were in full control of those decisions (these response options strongly
influenced my questionnaire format). In Washington, participation was measured by how
many means of communication and participation managers used: new employee
orientations, suggestion systems, quality circles, employee task forces, autonomous work
groups, profit-sharing plans, participative management training, labour-management
training, employee representation on board of directors, and others; firms that used four
or fewer of these were called “less participatory” and those using five or more “more
participatory.”
They found that average annual growth in sales was significantly higher in New
York for ESOPs than for controls, and ESOP employment growth in Washington out-
performed that for controls, though not significantly. In Washington, the margins (ESOPs
over controls) for both sales and employment growth were significantly (and
substantially) higher for the more participatory firms. For New York, growth in sales per
employee was highly correlated with the degree of employee participation, holding share
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of ownership, ESOP participation rate, and voting rights constant. Over all, they
concluded that they found no consistent effects for ownership alone, only “a
complementary effect of ownership and workplace democracy” (p.417), a result that jibes
with the consensus noted by Rosen (of the NCEO) and other analysts and with Conte and
Svejnar’s observations, and which motivates my hypotheses below.
Kruse and Blasi (1997) wrote a thorough and exacting review of studies of
employee ownership on attitudes and performance. Focusing on ESOPs only, these
authors performed a meta-analysis of eleven studies of performance (some cross-
sectional, some at adoption of ESOPs, and some post-ESOP adoption) and concluded that
“most of the tests strongly reject, for each of the three types of comparisons, the null
hypothesis of a zero relationship …” (p.137). “The average estimated productivity
difference between ESOP and non-ESOP firms is 6.2 percent, while the average
estimated pre/post-adoption difference is 4.4 percent” (p.144), though most individual
studies do not reject their null hypotheses. But almost no studies show worse
performance for ESOPs, which “flies in the face of theoretical predictions that employee
ownership will lead to deteriorating workplace relations, decisions, and performance”20
(p.145).
In testimony before Congress in 2002, Kruse expanded further on his and Blasi’s
meta-analysis noted above. Adding several studies to the ones covered in 1997, he
reported to a Senate committee that “productivity improves by an extra 4-5% on average
in the year an ESOP is adopted, and the higher productivity level is maintained in
                                                 
20 They note that some authors predict inadequate supervision, underinvestment, and/or
inefficient decision-making. On the other hand, many of these predictions assume
worker-management as well as worker ownership, and most ESOPs in the U.S. are far
from worker-managed.
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subsequent years.” Further, “employee ownership was linked to faster employment
growth in three of four studies,” and “employee ownership is linked to higher rates of
firm survival;” U.S. public companies existing in 1983 were 20% more likely to survive
through 1995 if they were substantially employee-owned.
Participation effects
Conte and Svejnar (1990) published a lengthy review  of the literature on worker
ownership and participation, in which they summarized two earlier studies of their own,
along with several others. Reporting on their whole review, they note that “Perhaps the
clearest evidence concerns the effect of participation in employee-owned companies. The
evidence shows that participation groups improve company performance in an employee
ownership setting...” (167).
Freeman and Rogers (1999) reported on a large mid-1990’s study of employee
involvement (EI) programs in US firms. EI programs included such practices as “quality
circles and discussion groups, total quality management, self-directed work teams, safety
committees,[and]  production committees…” (p.101). They found that EI programs were
widespread (52% of respondents said their firms had at least one type), and that “Workers
believe  that EI improves company performance … and studies of worker participation in
company decision-making suggest that, at a minimum, such programs do not harm
productivity on average and, more likely than not, raise it” (p.116).
A 1997 study by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi focused on “innovative
employment practices” in the steel industry in the U.S. They found that “Lines using a set
of innovative work practices, which include incentive pay, teams, flexible job
assignments, employment security, and training, achieve substantially higher levels of
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productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach, which includes narrow job
definitions, strict work rules, and hourly pay with close supervision” (p.291).
A 1999 study by Buchele and Christiansen—which, incidentally, shares much
theoretical grounding about work processes with this paper—looks not at worker
ownership nor worker participation (as an independent variable), but rather at workers’
rights on the job, starting with the hypothesis that “workers’ willingness to give up the
protection provided by rigid work rules, disclose their proprietary knowledge [to
management], and initiate changes in the production process that raise labor productivity
depends on their ability to trust management to honor commitments to long-term
employment and productivity gain sharing” (p.94). They develop two orthogonal indices
of workers’ rights in 15 advanced capitalist countries (factor-analyzing such measures as
collective bargaining coverage, unemployment insurance replacement rate, and statutory
requirements for notice prior to dismissal), and discover that both measures have
significant and substantial positive effects on average annual productivity (output per
hour) growth among these countries. These observations jibe with my observations in the
introduction that workers will be reluctant to invest in (“own”) their work unless they
really own their work—that is, unless they see a direct connection  between improved
output and improved quality of worklife, leisure, or income, and have assurance that their
investments in process improvement will not threaten their tenure.
A study by Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000) looked at sales and productivity
effects of “employee involvement” (including profit-sharing and various HR practices, as
reported in a survey of HR managers). Their “analysis cannot detect an EI effect on
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productivity,” although they did “find some evidence that incentive pay affects
productivity, albeit one that varies with estimating technique and specification” (p.12).
Kruse, Freeman and five others (2003) did another study in an effort to determine
what more is needed (besides employee ownership) to resolve the free-rider problem, to
generate “a corporate culture that emphasizes company spirit, promotes group
cooperation, encourages social enforcement mechanisms, and so forth” (citing Weitzman
& Kruse 1990, p. 100). These authors suggest (p.6) that
Firms, or workers, must do something more [than just ownership and
involvement] to prevent free riding behavior from destroying employee
morale and the potential of an ownership incentive system. They must set
in  motion forces that lead employees to view themselves as critical
contributors to output even though each individual’s contribution is
modest, much as democracies must motivate voters to go to the polls even
though it is rare that any single vote determines any election.
They gathered Human Resources policies from 11 ESOP firms, and compared surveys of
employee attitudes among those firms. A derived “involvement index” of HR policies
was positively correlated to positive employee reports of co-worker performance,
perceptions of fairness, and perceptions of worker input and influence. “Within-firm
comparisons in three ESOP firms … show that employee-owners who participate in
employee involvement committees are more likely to exert peer pressure on shirking co-
workers” (from the abstract). They argue that their results suggest that positive
performance effects from employee ownership would require (1) viable and visible
incentives, (2) participative mechanisms allowing workers to affect policies and
procedures, and (3) developing a corporate culture that “battles against tendencies to free
ride” (from the abstract).
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Lastly, Sesil (2006) looked at a sample of British manufacturers over a ten-year
period, looking at both workers’ degree of control—meaning that (for example) they
have the authority to shut down the production process if they perceive a quality problem
(“shopfloor or worker quality task control”)—and return, some form of group incentive
(either profit-sharing or company-wide bonuses). He controlled for quality of workforce
and skill level by using a dummy variable for “whether the blue-collar workforce is given
multi-skill training.” Neither control nor return alone had significant effects on return on
assets or return on sales, but when they were both present, positive performance effects
were highly significant—and substantial—in most models.
Hypotheses
Based on the theories discussed earlier, and on the thrust of the empirical
literature, I have generated the following hypotheses to test:
• Firms which are substantially owned by employees will be more productive than similar
firms owned in a traditional manner. Here, “substantially” means that the ESOP owns at
least 50% of firm value; “similar” means in the same or very similar industry, and having
close to the same number of employees; and “productive” refers to sales per employee
per year. This is the principal hypothesis, and will be tested with a one-tailed measure
(the null will be that KO firms are equally or more productive).
• Each of the following should improve EO firms’ margin of productivity (if any) over
matched KO firms:
 ESOP ownership of a higher portion of firm value (more collective
“investment” by employees, perhaps implying more control by workers and
more centrality of employee ownership to firm culture);
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 Higher ESOP firm value held per participant (higher individual “investment”
by employees, perhaps providing more incentive);
 Higher degree of worker control over various aspects of their jobs (since the
opportunity to affect production and other decisions is necessary for
ownership to matter, and control should enhance workers’ sense of
ownership);21 and
 Smallness of the firm (reflecting the discussions above about firm culture and
the 1/N effect).
David Laibman (personal communication) has suggested that ownership effects
may be stronger in labor-intensive industries than capital-intensive ones, since if worker
effort improves productivity, that will matter more when labor is a larger factor in
production. Thus I will test the following hypothesis:
• EO firms’ margin of productivity over KO firms (if any) will be greater for retail,
wholesale, information, business services, health and education, leisure, and service
industries (NAICS 4 through 8) than for extraction, construction and utilities, and
manufacturing (NAICS 2 and 3). While this is a grossly simplified dichotomy, it is a fair
first approximation.
Lastly, because construction firms hire large numbers of workers on a project
basis—workers who have no firm ownership—I will also perform some of the above
tests excluding construction firms.
                                                 
21 For this test, I will look both at a worker-control score derived from detailed survey
questions, and at the management-to-worker ratio as reported in the survey. There is so
little choice by workers of firm directors, and so little variation in union presence, that
this information from the surveys is not usable.
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Chapter 4: Data Sources and Methodology
The employee-ownership panel
My original plan for obtaining data for this study was to obtain a list of major
employee-owned firms from the National Center for Employee Ownership (which I did,
for a fee), and then to gain productivity and other relevant information from the 2002
Census of Manufactures at the Census Data Center (at Baruch College). While I was in
preliminary discussion with CDC Director Rosemary Hyson with regard to access,
Douglas Kruse and Joseph Blasi informed me of The ESOP Association’s (TEA) interest
in my study. The ESOP Association is a business trade group of companies owned by
employees through an employee stock ownership plan; its member firms are, in the main,
fully owned by their ESOP Trusts. After some discussion with them and TEA President
Michael Keeling, it became clear that the TEA was prepared to provide me with their
membership list of employee-owned firms and associated proprietary data, as well as to
endorse, print, and mail out my survey questionnaire about worker influence in firm
management. Blasi also suggested that I could get relevant data on these firms (and find
matching firms) from the D&B (Dun and Bradstreet) Million-dollar Database. Given the
discouraging responses I had gotten from Hyson, I decided to proceed with the TEA’s
data, and to use the D&B database to obtain sales, employment, and industry
classifications. Luckily, as a former adjunct at Baruch, I was able to search and download
D&B data on-line through Baruch College Library’s subscription.
First, let me note that this database is not designed for this type of comprehensive
data retrieval, and all data gathering, including finding matches, was extremely tedious.
Most annoying, the data was often internally contradictory, in the following way: each
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firm location (that is, branch or self-standing firm) lists “sales (this site)”, “sales (all
sites)”, “employment (this site)”, and “employment (all sites)”. But quite often—I would
estimate in at least 20% of company records—there are different employment numbers
for the two entries, but identical sales figures. Despite many calls to D&B’s data people, I
got no satisfactory explanation of how to interpret this inconsistency. In several cases of
multi-site or multi-subsidiary firms, however, I looked at D&B’s “corporate linkage”
information, and noted that the sum of all subsidiary employment tallied closely with the
“employment all,” and the sum of subsidiary sales figures tallied closely with “sales all,”
so where I had to use these records, I used the “employment all” and “sales all” figures.
I narrowed the TEA’s membership list to those 292 firms in which the ESOP trust
owns 50% or more of firm value, and which have 100 or more employees, both according
to the TEA’s data; the minimum firm size was chosen simply to make the task tractable.
At a later date, after receiving and compiling survey questionnaire returns, I added the 81
firms which had returned surveys (but which had not been included in the first panel
because the TEA’s information indicated they have fewer than 100 employees) in order
to fully investigate the effects of worker influence. I queried the D&B database for each
of my employee-owned firms, and downloaded and recorded sales (all sites),
employment (all sites), and detailed (6-digit) industry (NAICS, the North American
Industrial Classification System). I use all-site data on the grounds that ownership is of a
corporate complex, not of a particular site. Of the firms I started with (members of the
ESOP Association with more than 50% employee ownership and 100 or more employees,
according to the Association’s data), I could not find 30 in the database, even after
searching Google and their websites for possible alternate names, and these cases had to
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be dropped.22 In addition, 2 of the original firms that I found in the database had no
estimates of employment, so these also had to be dropped, leaving 260 firms. These
searches, and those for matching non-employee-owned firms, were done between
August, 2007, and February, 2008. D&B occasionally updates its data; I noticed only one
or two very minor changes when I had to revisit files for various reasons, so I believe this
is a short enough time span that comparisons are valid.
I further checked each ESOP firm in the panel against a recent (2004) database
provided by the IRS (and publicly available—thanks to Douglas Kruse for the simplified
format) to be sure that it was indeed an Employee Stock Ownership Plan firm. Those that
I did not confirm I cross-checked with www.freeerisa.com, a free database that covers the
same material. There were several firms that I still did not confirm as having ESOPs until
I checked their websites and saw them proclaim their employee ownership. Altogether, I
dropped 7 of the original EO firms because they had been bought out, had only profit-
sharing plans, or were otherwise confirmed as not having ESOPs, leaving 253 firms. I
could find no viable matching KO firms for three of these, leaving 250 of the original
292, plus 81 from the survey-return group. The resulting employee-owned firms panel
has 331 firms; statistics for the panels appear in chapter 5.
                                                 
22 Because all these firms are privately held, these data were often reported as estimated. I
am concerned that D&B’s algorithm for estimation may be simple enough that close
matches by industry and size may yield the same estimated sales per employee, biasing
any comparisons toward zero (I confirmed this in some cases: multiple matches with
estimated sales and employment often had identical S/E). For this reason I noted whether
each record showed “actual” or “estimated/modeled,” and did so also with the matching
firm records. I will perform tests both using and excluding estimated data. The small
sample size argues against exclusion, so if the “actual” results are similar I will use the
full panels.
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The non-employee-owned, “matching” firms panel
For each EO firm, I queried the database seeking firms with an identical 6-digit
NAICS, and with employment within about 10% of the firm’s employment. Because
majority-EO firms are by definition not subsidiaries, I limited the search to non-
subsidiary firms, and asked the database to provide full-corporation numbers (not, for
example, employment and sales at a branch location).
• If this yielded a reasonable number of matches (about 1 to 10), I accepted these.
If not, I widened the employment range a bit, up to about ±20%.
• If this yielded matches, I accepted these. If not, I widened the industry range,
successively dropping specificity from the NAICS, though I would not go below a 3-digit
match, and used my judgment in accepting less-specific industry matches (for example,
in attempting to match a large tire-repair firm, I accepted other types of auto repair firms,
but not car washes, even though they share the same 4-digit designation). If there were no
matches within about 20% of the employment target at this point—this occurred in only 3
cases—I marked the case as “no matches” and deleted it from the sample.
• In many cases (business services such as printing or engineering consultancies,
in particular), I obtained an unreasonably high number of matching firms, even narrowing
employment to an exact number. In such cases, I selected matches just from the state of
the EO firm and immediately surrounding states. In several cases among smaller
companies with many more potential matches, I narrowed the matches to just the same
state in order to get a tractable number—and even then wound up with twenty or more
matches for several EO firms.
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• Obviously non-profit (university-related, for example) and government
enterprises were excluded, since their cost and operations structures may be very
different from for-profit firms.
• Once the full list of 2,254 potential matches was complete, I then checked these
firms for employee ownership in the same way as the ESOPs. 42 potential matches (three
of them multiple appearances of the same firm) were dropped because I confirmed that
those firms did have ESOPs. One EO firm lost its single match in this way; by
broadening my parameters I found five satisfactory new matches, leaving 2,217 matches
in the KO panel.
Firms with fewer than 100 employees are required to file 5500 forms only every 3
years, so the 2004 file of IRS 5500 data did not include smaller firms that have ESOPs. I
checked all 841 matching firms on FreeErisa (a tedious job that could only be done one at
a time), and deleted five firms which have ESOP plans (including one plan which had
been liquidated in 2004, in case any effects linger);23 the final KO panel has 2,212 firms.
Dealing with multiple matches
For those EO firms with multiple matches, I created a matching “meta-firm,”
using a weighted average of sales per employee among the firms in that firm’s match
group (total sales divided by total employment)24. This enables the matching-firm panel
to have the same size and industry distribution as the ESOP panel, and avoids potential
                                                 
23 Many of these firms (as with the larger matching firms) have 401K plans, “profit-
sharing” plans, and/or pension plans. I assume that these do not represent a meaningful
share of firm ownership by employees, and thus that most employees are not part of a
culture of “we own it.”
24 While a non-weighted average S/E might be equally justifiable, there will be almost no
difference, since matching firms in each group have identical or very similar
employment.
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distortion of comparisons due to different numbers of firms in different industries. It was
suggested that this potential distortion could be controlled for by using regressors for
industry, and I will test whether including all matching KO firms affects results.
Employer value per employee
The TEA membership list contains estimates of the share of firm value held by its
ESOP; these are generally unavailable elsewhere, though I did ask for this information in
my survey, and used the survey value when these differed (note that I also asked for total
employment in the survey, but, to be consistent with data from the matching firms, did
not substitute these for D&B’s employment numbers). However, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that the size of each employee’s “investment” in their ESOP may also affect
their sense of firm ownership (or correlate with some aspect of firm culture such as
promotion of “ownership” among the staff). I therefore used the IRS data file to obtain
the total value of firm securities held by each ESOP and the total number of ESOP
participants, giving me an average firm value held per participant (as of 2004). When I
was unable to find the firms in the IRS file, I obtained the relevant data from
FreeErisa.com, although in some cases these data were available from 2005 rather than
2004; I consider this a minor issue, because such minor discrepancies should wash out
over the broad range of firms.25
                                                 
25 In the IRS database, the firm name is in the column “Sponsor name,” and the data in
columns labeled “Total active, retired, and separated beneficiary count” and “Employer
securities end-of-year amount.” On the 5500 forms posted by FreeErisa.com, the
participant count is in line 7f, and the value of employer securities held is in Schedule I,
line 3(d) (for “small plans”) or Schedule H, Part 1, line D(1) (for “large plans”); I used




My understanding of “productivity” leads me to prefer value added per
production worker (omitting administrative workers who cannot affect output pace or
quality) as the most valid measure. But for privately held firms, these data are essentially
inaccessible without access to the Census of Manufactures. As discussed above, this
access, while pursued, was not possible. Rosen (2007) notes that
Data on the economic performance of public companies are available from
a variety of sources, but data on private companies, other than sales and
employment (available from Dun and Bradstreet), are not. Few private
companies will provide financial data, making studies that rely on
productivity, profits, stock prices, return on assets, or other measures,
essentially impossible.
Firms’ concerns with security of their information are such that in order to maximize
survey questionnaire returns, I did not dare to ask for any financial information on these
questionnaires. Given these limitations, there was little issue in this study about using
sales per employee. Note that Winther and Marens (1997) used both annual growth in
sales and growth in sales per employee as outcome measures. And while sales per
employee is clearly affected by type of industry, the fact that I am using matched panels
should wash out any distortion from such effects.
Developing a survey questionnaire for employee participation
In order better to understand the effects of employee ownership and participation
in firm governance on firm outcomes, it is necessary first to have some measure(s) of
participation. I assume that, in employee-owned as in traditional firms, managers
“participate” in management, so the measures of interest here would be whether and how
much production workers (broadly defined) control decisions within the firm. While there
have been many articles purporting to describe the effects of employee participation in
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firm governance (often in conjunction with other determinants), researchers’ measures of
participation have ranged from rudimentary to thorough.
Cable and Fitzroy (1980) looked at "productive efficiency" among West German
firms. They asked managers to rate worker involvement in each of eight decision-making
areas, from determining piece rates to price and investment policy (their article did not
list the other six); in each of the eight areas they were asked to indicate whether workers
had no participation, were observers, were advisers, or were active participants. For their
summary variable, each of the eight responses was given equal weight; they say that their
regression results were consistent across various alternative weighting schemes.
Jones and Svejnar (1985a), in their study of Italian producer cooperatives, just
used the fraction of the workforce (of each producer cooperative) that were member-
owners as an indicator for the level of employee participation. Conte and Svejnar (1988),
studying total factor productivity among U.S. manufacturers, used dummy variables for
(any) employee participation plan, for workers' participation in decisions about wages,
and for workers' participation in production decisions, as well as a continuous measure of
the unionized share of the workforce.
Smith (1985), in his evaluation of a hypothesis that participation at the workplace
would influence civic participation, asked workers how often they discussed (with the
relevant personnel) issues about work practices; company financial policies; hiring,
firing, and layoff of production workers; and selection and activities of supervisors and
management—and then took a simple average of these responses as an indicator of
participation.
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Doucouliagos's (1995) meta-analysis of "participatory capitalist firms" used only
a dummy variable for participation ("joint decision making or influence sharing between
employees and managers").
Grunberg, Moore & Greenberg (1996) compared cooperatives, ESOP firms,
union-represented firms, and non-union firms in the wood products industry. Their
participation measures were based on survey responses from workers regarding their
degree of decision-making power on issues "like company spending, hiring priorities, and
pay scale;" on how much say they have in selecting the Board of Directors; and on their
degree of influence over safety practices and working conditions in general.
Winther and Marens (1997) tried a comprehensive set of indicators in their study
of growth among employee-owned firms in New York State. They asked firm managers
to
rate their perception of employee influence in making operational
decisions in six areas: investment, purchase of tools and equipment,
budgets and cost control, work organization, health and safety and
decisions pertaining to the general work environment. Respondents chose
one of the following for each kind of decision: (1) employees had no
influence at all, (2) management's decisions were communicated to the
employees, (3) employees were encouraged to make suggestions or
express opinions, (4) employees' suggestions were regarded as equal to
management's and their suggestions were implemented on an equal
footing with management's, and, finally, (5) employees were in full
control of these decisions.
In the same publication, these authors analyzed a parallel study on Washington State
firms, using a very different approach to measuring participation. Here they asked
managers whether their firms used new employee orientations, suggestion systems,
quality circles, employee task forces, autonomous work groups, profit-sharing plans,
participative management training, labor-management training, employee representation
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on board of directors, or any other means of employee participation. However, their
participation indicator was a binary indicator for using four or fewer of these techniques
vs. using five or more—given the disparate nature of these techniques, I would argue a
very weak indicator.
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), looking at steel production plants,
constructed an elaborate set of HR variables from interviews with both managers and
union representatives, including whether there was profit-sharing, formal work teams,
sharing of company financial information, and regular meetings of line managers with
production workers. Because of extensive collinearity among these indicators, they
grouped firms into four levels of participation: (1) traditional, hierarchical firms with
essentially no worker participation; (2) firms that have instituted some team-production
practices and some information-sharing; (3) firms that have high levels of team
production and information sharing, with extensive skills training; and (4) firms that also
explicitly screen new hires for fitting into a cooperative work environment, provide group
incentive pay, offer employment security, offer job rotations, and meet regularly with line
workers.
While Chinese law provides for substantial participation of employees in firm
governance, Li (2004) argued that this provision was far from broadly honored, and
developed a measure of participation based on surveys of union leaders as to (1)
frequency of meetings of the firm’s Congress of Employee Representatives, (2) whether
decisions on business budgeting, major investments, and ownership changes are made by
employees or by management (5-point scale), (3) who makes decisions about
distributions of wages and bonuses and about internal rules and policies (5-point scale),
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and (4) who makes decisions about uses of the employee benefits fund, employee
housing, and other major employee welfare issues (5-point scale).
Sesil (2006), in a study of performance of British manufacturing firms, used a
dummy indicator called “control” for whether shopfloor workers “have a high degree of
control over job tasks (e.g. the authority to shut down the production process if they
perceive there is a quality problem).”
Finally, and most directly relevant to the measure I am seeking, Ben-Ner et al.
(2000) used a survey of firms (primarily responded to by HR managers) in Minnesota in
their study of prevalence of employee ownership and profit-sharing plans. The survey
was intended to measure the extent of “employee involvement” in firm decision-making,
as a parallel dependent variable to the presence of ESOP and profit-sharing plans.
Respondents were asked to indicate (on a 5-point Likert scale, from “Workers have no
influence at all” to “Workers have the power to make decisions on their own”) the extent
of  non-managerial employee participation in fifteen types of decisions, as follows:
primary group: secondary group:
working conditions
pay and other compensation
selection of personnel
equipment maintenance











The authors created two dependent variables: a broad indicator of involvement, an
average of all 15 Likert scores; and an average of only the items in the primary group,
“decisions with considerable operational significance to the firm.” (pp.205-6). No
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explanation was given, however, for how “job redesign” and “production planning”
might be less significant that “selection of new equipment,” for example.
My survey instrument
Unlike several of these cited studies, I make a clear distinction between company
practices that are called participation, and those which actually empower production
workers. Starting in the 1980s, in their relentless race to increase productivity, U.S.
manufacturers expanded Japanese-modeled team production (e.g., Saturn auto plants), in
which (among other dynamics) line workers were asked to volunteer information that
could improve efficiency—essentially to “buy into” their otherwise repetitive jobs. But,
as pointed out repeatedly by worker advocates (see, for example, Parker and Slaughter,
1988), the invitations to participate came with no material rewards, and in many cases
workers understood that productivity improvements might well lead to reduced
employment (layoffs, or reduced overtime when overtime pay was seen as necessary to
maintain a standard of living).
Thus ownership, with its implication (or explicit promise) of job security, is an
essential ingredient in allowing production workers’ knowledge of their jobs (and their
inherent creativity) to lead to work method improvements. Employee-owners can be
invited to participate in kaizan, but if suggestions are handled as suggestions most often
are in traditionally owned firms (that is, ignored), or if higher-level decisions such as
about products, marketing, and management personnel are out of bounds, there will be
little incentive to participate. Thus my questionnaire does not ask about team production,
wider ranges of job training, or other aspects of work organization that may lead to
greater job satisfaction without giving true control over one’s work.
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The grid section of the questionnaire I developed is based largely on the Ben-Ner
model, but with strong influence from Winther and Marens’ study. I felt that the Ben-Ner
et al. response categories (1) and (2) were not clearly different, and modified (2)
accordingly. Finally, I adjusted (3) through (5) to make what I thought were clearer and
more realistic distinctions. Similarly, I added to their list of areas of control several
elements suggested by the other literature here, as well as some of my own. The overall
questionnaire is also based on issues of worker control that come from over thirty years
of my own experience as a blue-collar worker and worker-advocate. Drafts of the
questionnaire were sent to several firm managers suggested by Michael Keeling for their
review, and several items were clarified in response to discussions with these managers.
The final survey questionnaire as sent to TEA member firms is reproduced in the
appendix.26
Dealing with survey responses
I received 154 usable survey responses (a very few had ambiguous responses that
I was unable to clarify upon contacting the respondents), a remarkable 22% return rate. I
entered all the responses in a database; the responses to the grid questions were coded 1
(least worker influence) to 5 (most), and where respondents checked multiple boxes I
used mean values. In one case where a firm had different responses for different sites, I
used scores that were averages of site scores, weighted by employment at each site. The
responses to the question about union representation were nearly all zero, so I did not use
these. I then used SPSS to run a factor analysis, a standard social-science survey
                                                 
26 Layout of the survey questionnaire has been adjusted to fit print guidelines for this
dissertation, but the content is identical to the original.
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procedure to attempt to extract commonality from among survey elements,27 including
responses to management-to-worker ratio (0 - 1) and share of Board of Directors chosen
by workers (0 - 100%), both of which seem to me to be potential indicators of “worker
control.” Only one factor with any meaning resulted; the residual factors represented 8%
or less of the total variance of the data, so I treat these as simply part of the residual
variance—that is, noise. The weighting on the management-to-worker ratio was
ridiculously small (-0.03), suggesting that this variable had no meaningful correlation
with the other variables. When I performed the analysis again without this variable, the
portion of total variance (of fewer variables) represented by the first factor changed from
41.5% to 44.3%. However, the weighting on the next variable, share of Board of
Directors chosen by workers, was still only 0.19, while weights on the grid variables
ranged from 0.52 to 0.77. It seemed to me that removing that variable (and including it
separately in the regression) would again improve the fit of the factor, and, indeed, the
new factor represents 47.0% of the total variation among the grid answers. I used these
factor weights to obtain worker-influence scores for each of the responding firms.28 Table
1 shows the imputed weights for the new “worker control” variable, and its correlations
with each of the variables it incorporates.
                                                 
27 “Factor analysis is used to discover patterns among the variations in values of several
variables, essentially through the generation of artificial dimensions (factors) that
correlate highly with several of the real variables” (Babbie 1990, p.313).
28 There were 17 questions on the grid, and 154 responses, so the raw scores are a 154 x
17 matrix, RS. The factor is reported as a 17 x 1 vector, F, so the worker-influence scores
are RS X F. Where there were missing raw scores, rather than drop the entire response set
for that firm, I assigned the mean score for that question to that firm; this preserves the
means for each question and retains appropriate rank-ordering among the firms. Factor
analysis essentially provides the “appropriate” weighting for creating such composite
scores from varied responses.
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Table 1: Factor derived from answers to survey questions about worker influence
Worker influence on … Weight in factor
Correlation with
consolidating variable
Innovation in work processes 0.722 .720
Safety procedures 0.526 .526
Physical layout of environment 0.663 .664
Quality control 0.664 .655
Investment policies 0.685 .663
Hiring and promotions 0.749 .741
Equipment maintenance 0.653 .661
Company Philanthropy 0.658 .634
Wage levels 0.668 .651
Overtime allocation 0.672 .651
Work schedules 0.711 .711
New products 0.769 .734
Marketing 0.712 .695
Evaluating supervisors 0.646 .615
Equipment purchases 0.730 .719
Benefit offerings 0.688 .667
Profit allocation 0.665 .623
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Chapter 5: Data descriptions and issues of validity
There were several efforts to verify the quality of the data used in these analyses. I
compared D&B employment numbers with the employer-reported firm sizes from
returned survey questionnaires; the mean absolute difference between the D&B figures
and these presumably accurate numbers was 18.2% of the survey-reported figures, and
the correlation a very satisfactory 0.978. To be consistent with the matching-firm data,
however, I used D&B employment numbers even when the survey-reported numbers
were different.
The only reliable source for the shares of firm value owned by the ESOP Trusts is
the survey returns, but The ESOP Association provided their estimates, based on reports
(which may be several years old) by their member firms. The correlation between these
numbers was only 0.434, but the mean absolute discrepancy between the shares as
reported was only 15.2% of the survey-return values. Because I assume the self-reports in
the survey are more accurate than the TEA’s values, I replaced the TEA values with the
survey values where available.
The next issue I wish to address here is whether there is any inherent bias in the
survey-response rate—that is, is there an observable difference between firms which
returned the survey questionnaire and those which did not, potentially making any
derived measures unrepresentative?
Are survey returns representative?
Questionnaires were mailed by the ESOP Association to 692 member firms in
August, 2007. Over the next few months, I received 154 questionnaires (a 22% response,
or 19% when weighted by firm size) which had usable information in the Likert-scale
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section. A few markings were non-standard, such as percentages instead of check marks.
I consulted with these respondents by phone and email, and received explanations that
allowed me to translate those markings to usable responses. I compared the responding
firms with the surveyed firms, and was satisfied that the former were reasonably
representative of all the firms in the ESOP sample. The data for that evaluation follow in
tables 2 and 3, and are graphically presented in figures 1 and 2.
Table 2: Distribution of firm size (total employment as reported to the ESOP
Association) among surveys sent and surveys returned
Surveyed Returned
Total employment count = 692 count = 154






Over 2500 1.2% 0.6%
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Figure 1: Distribution of firm size (total employment as reported to the ESOP





























Table 3: Distribution of industrial sector (one-digit SIC)* among surveys sent and
surveys returned
Surveyed Returned
Agriculture and related 1.2% 2.3%
Extraction & construction 13.8% 10.1%
Manufacturing (non-durable) 12.5% 15.5%
Manufacturing (durable) 20.9% 21.7%
Transportation, communications, and utilities 4.2% 7.8%
Wholesale & retail 21.3% 21.7%
Finance, insurance, and real estate 5.5% 5.4%
Personal services & recreation 7.8% 6.2%
Health, education, & social & business services 12.8% 9.3%
*Note that, while in the main analysis and matching, I use 6-digit NAICS
to identify firms by industry, The ESOP Association had pre-coded the
recipient firms by SIC, so it made more sense to break out by SIC in this
step.
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Is the TEA list of employee-owned firms representative?
The next question to be addressed is whether the firms in the EO panel
representative of all majority-employee-owned firms in the US (note that in many
surveys, or studies of supposedly random panels from a given universe, we simply
assume their representativeness). There are no official lists of employee-owned firms;
only the National Center for Employee Ownership gathers, maintains, and makes a list
available—and their list does not guarantee comprehensiveness. Since I had already
purchased the NCEO list prior to getting the ESOP Association’s list, I was able to
compare the two lists. Tables 4 through 6 and figures 3 and 4 show the results of
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comparing two of those distributions. The sector distributions seem very adequately
matched. Among the firms for which the NCEO provided share data, the NCEO list
seems to have a higher proportion 100%-owned by their ESOP Trusts than the TEA list.
However, I note that the NCEO did not provide these data for 65% of their listed firms,
and so I do not consider this to be a valid comparison. My primary concern is that the
NCEO list has a higher share of larger firms (employment ≥ 400) than does the TEA list
(25% compared to 12%).29 I would hope that resources are found to replicate some of
these comparisons using the larger NCEO list of majority-EO firms, recognizing that
ESOP share of ownership would not be available for that study, nor would any of the
survey-derived values.
Table 4: NCEO and TEA lists of majority-employee-owned firms by industrial
sector (1-digit SIC)
Sector (1-digit SIC) NCEO TEA
Extraction & construction 11.6% 14.0%
Manufacturing (non-durable) 13.4% 12.8%
Manufacturing (durable) 22.3% 20.8%
Transportation, communications, and utilities 2.7% 3.9%
Wholesale & retail 24.1% 21.7%
Finance, insurance, and real estate 7.0% 6.0%
Personal services & recreation 7.4% 8.2%
Health, education, & social & business services 11.6% 12.6%
                                                 
29 The NCEO also has a higher absolute number of larger firms. NCEO gathers its list
from news reports (of ESOP conversions, for example) and networking, and larger firms
are more likely to show up in these ways. It is also possible that larger EO firms perceive
less need to join an organization such as TEA.
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400 & over 24.6% 12.2%
* employment ranges were chosen to approximate quartiles for the NCEO distribution
Table 6: NCEO and TEA lists of majority-employee-owned firms by share of firm
value held by ESOP Trust
Share of firm owned by ESOP NCEO TEA
50-74.99% owned 24.8% 31.6%
75-99.99% owned 16.6% 22.7%
100% owned 58.6% 45.7%


































































































































































Are smaller firms representative?
The first part of the EO panel contains all the firms in the TEA’s list with 50% or
more ESOP share of firm value, and 100 or more employees (TEA data), except for a few
firms that were not confirmed as employee-owned or for which I could not obtain sales
information; thus this part of the EO panel is not a sample, but essentially the universe,
since there is no official list of EO firms. However, I added to the first part of the EO
panel 87 firms which have fewer than 100 employees, but which returned the survey
questionnaire, so I must confirm that those firms are representative of the TEA’s
“universe” of 382 EO firms with 50% or more share, but with 99 or fewer employees.
The results of the comparisons I undertook are in tables 7 through 9, and the data for
table 9 are also presented in figure 5. The comparisons by firm size and value share seem
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very reasonable. But while the differences by industry may seem small, the over-
representation of non-durable manufacturing and transportation in the sample, and the
under-representation of construction and FIRE, seem to me to demand that at least some
comparison runs be done both with and without these added firms (and their matches).
These validation tests are in the appendix, tables A-1 and A-2, and confirm that adding
these firms does not substantially change results
Table 7: Firm size distributions, smaller firms, questionnaires sent and returned




Table 8: Firm value share distributions, smaller firms, questionnaires sent and
returned





Table 9: Industrial sector distributions, smaller firms, questionnaires sent and
returned
One-digit SIC (per TEA) All TEA firms in range Surveys returned
Agriculture and related 1.7% 1.4%
Extraction & construction 14.0% 8.7%
Manufacturing (non-durable) 10.6% 17.4%
Manufacturing (durable) 20.1% 20.3%
Transportation, communications, and
utilities 3.8% 8.7%
Wholesale & retail 21.8% 24.6%
Finance, insurance, and real estate 7.5% 2.9%
Personal services & recreation 8.9% 7.2%
Health, education, & social & business
services 11.6% 8.7%
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Figure 5: Percentage point differences in sector distributions, small EO panel

























































































































































The final EO panel as gathered has 331 firms. As discussed in the next chapter,
when sales per employee difference (between the EO and matching KO firms) becomes
the dependent variable, data are closer to a normal distribution without three outliers;
once these are removed, the remaining panel is 328 firms. Tables 10 and 11 show
distributions by industrial sector (1-digit NAICS), employment, sales, firm value per
ESOP participant, share of total firm value owned by the ESOP, worker-control score,
management to non-management-worker ratio, and sales per employee. Further, to
illustrate the range of employment, figure 6 shows a histogram of log(employment) (base
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ten). As you can see, the range is from the teens through nearly 10,000 employees, with a
mode around 200.
Table 10: Industrial sector distribution (1-digit NAICS), EO firms panel (N = 328)
Employee-owned firms panel Share in industrial sector
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.3%
Extraction, Construction, Utilities 15.9%
Manufacturing 28.7%
Wholesale & retail & transportation 25.9%
Information & business services 25.6%
Education, health, & social services 2.1%
Arts & leisure 0.9%
Other services 0.6%
Total 100.0%
Table 11: EO firms panel distributions of employment, sales, ESOP total value per
employee-owner (valperee), share of firm value owned by ESOP trust (ESOPshr),
worker influence index (WorkCtrl), management-to-worker ratio (mgtratio), and
sales per employee (without 3 outliers)
    Employment Sales Valperee ESOPshr WorkCtrl mgtratio Salesperee
N Valid 328 328 303 328 127 127 328
  Missing     25   201 201  
Mean   496 94551560 67800 0.878 28.0 0.186 209042
Median   210 29800000 43630 1.000 26.6 0.150 142489
Std. Deviation   1061 237641823 79877 0.166 7.5 0.146 228540
Minimum   12 1000000 1272 0.500 12.4 0.040 7598
Maximum   9600 2512497000 753955 1.000 47.4 1.000 1708333
Percentiles 25 108 13725000 23737 0.750 22.2 0.100 84735
  75 448 71359725 84513 1.000 33.6 0.200 232605
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Similar statistics are given for the entire KO panel in tables 12 and 13, although of course
I have only industrial sector, sales, and employment for these.
Table 12: Industrial sector distribution (1-digit NAICS), KO firms panel (before
aggregation) (N = 2,212)
Capital-owned firms panel (all firms before aggregation) Share in industrial sector
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.0%
Extraction, Construction, Utilities 24.1%
Manufacturing 24.5%
Wholesale & retail & transportation 24.0%
Information & business services 23.7%
Education, health, & social services 1.9%




Table 13: Full KO firms panel distributions of employment, sales, and sales per
employee
    Employment Sales salesperee
N 2212 2212 2212
Mean 308.66 58,857,479 170,283
Median 150.00 16,400,000 110,109
Std. Deviation 755.396 343,398,975 428,714
Minimum 10 60,000 960
Maximum 10325 9,840,304,000 17,830,000
Percentiles 25 60.00 5,800,000 72,222
  75 300.00 39,000,000 182,955
Calculating the average sales per employee for each match group yields 328
“meta-firms” in an aggregated-firm KO panel (without the outliers). By virtue of the
matching procedure, the distribution by industry is identical to that of the EO panel,
represented in table 10 above. Employment and sales per employee (of each meta-firm)
are shown in table 14, and I show the log(employment) histogram for the aggregated KO
panel in figure 7 as well. Very close matches in the statistics between the EO and
aggregate KO panels on employment reassure me of the quality of the matching process.
Table 14: Aggregated KO panel, distribution of mean employment per “meta-





Std. Deviation 1057 120319
Minimum 12 17955
Maximum 9558 794412
Percentiles 25 109 92981
75 438 199224
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Chapter 6: Test results
The first series of tests was simply to see if there are meaningful differences in
sales per employee (S/E) between the two panels. A preliminary paired-samples
differences test yielded a highly significant EO firm advantage in S/E over KO firms
(p<.004 two-tailed, but since my hypothesis is directional, a one-tailed test is appropriate,
so I reject this null at p<.002). For each test below, I also show and discuss differences in
the logarithm of sales per employee between EO and matching KO firms; these give us
the ability to estimate percent differences between the two. In some cases results are
weak and/or ambiguous; these hypotheses are not confirmed, and these variables are not
studied further. In some cases, however, the tests show strong and consistent results, and
it is a matter of preference whether we report the EO sales per employee advantage as a
difference or as a ratio (or percent difference).
Table 15: paired-sample differences test, full panel





SEEO 233904 331 413862 22748







95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Lower Upper
SEEO - SEKO 66303 415609 22844 21365 111241 2.9024 330 0.0040
The paired-sample difference test used here requires that the difference being
tested be distributed (approximately) normally (Keller and Warrack 2003, 472); the
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suggested “test” for validity is just to observe a histogram, which appears in figure 8. I
noted that there appear to be 3 major outliers; deleting these three (in which sales per
employee for the EO firm less average sales per employee for the matching KO firms
was, respectively, $2.3 million, $5.9 million, and negative $820,000) improves the
distribution enough towards normality (see figure 9) that all further tests are done on the
panel without these outliers.
Figure 8: distribution of sales per employee differences, EO firm less matched

























































































































































































































Figure 9: distribution of sales per employee differences, EO firm less matched




















































































































































































































































Redoing the above test without the outliers yields the following table:
Table 16a: paired-sample differences test, full panel (without 3 outliers)
SEEO is S/E for each EO firm, and SEKO is S/E for that firm’s aggregated matches.
  Paired Samples Statistics  
  Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SEEO 209042 328 228540 12619
SEKO 164518 328 120319 6643
  Paired Samples Test          
  Paired Differences            
 
MeanStd. Deviation Std. Error Mean
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference t df Sig. (2-tailed)
        Lower Upper      
SEEO - SEKO 44524 229240 12658 19624 69425 3.518 327 .0005
On average, then, these employee-owned firms have $44,500 higher S/E than
their matching (aggregate) KO firms. A one-tailed significance of p<.0003 strongly
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suggests that this result can be generalized to the universe: it is less than .03% likely that
we would see these data if, on average, KO firms had sales per employee equal to or
larger than similar EO firms.30
Table 16b: paired-sample differences test in logs, full panel (without 3 outliers)
lnseeo is the natural logarithm of sales per employee for the EO firm, and lnseko is the natural logarithm of
sales per employee for the corresponding aggregate KO firm
  Paired Samples Statistics    
  Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
lnseeo 11.8941 328 .81688 .04510
lnseko 11.8093 328 .63184 .03489










Mean Lower Upper t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
lnseeo - lnseko .08474 .79040 .04364 -.00111 .17060 1.942 327 .053
On average, across these panels, the (S/E)EO:(S/E)KO ratio is exp(.08474) = 1.088, which
says that EO firms have an 8.8% average advantage in sales per employee over their KO
matches. This difference is highly significant (one-tailed p<.027). These results confirm
the major hypothesis of this study.
The next hypothesis to be tested is that employee ownership can make more of a
positive difference in sales per employee in smaller firms. Figure 10 shows a scatter-plot
                                                 
30 This conclusion depends on the assumption that the EO panel is a reasonably random
selection from the universe of EO firms.
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of the difference SEEO – SEKO against log of employment;31 the implied trendline has a
clearly negative slope.
Figure 10: EO firm sales per employee less matching KO “meta-firm” sales per




















To estimate this effect, I regressed EOadv on employment; the results are presented in
table 17a. The coefficient on employment is indeed negative, with a one-tailed p<.029.
On average, among these firms, an EO firm with 100 fewer employees than another has a
$2,263 greater advantage in S/E over its matching KO aggregate “firm,” and it is less
                                                 
31 Log of employment is used because firm sizes are clustered in the low hundreds; this
makes it easier to see the data points.
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than 2.9% likely that, among all EO and KO firms, larger EO firms have higher
advantages than or the same advantages as smaller ones.  Table 17b, the comparison
using logs, says that, on average, EO firms improve their sales-per-employee advantage
by 0.8% for each 100 fewer employees they have, and this pattern is also highly
significant. The nearly identical R-squared statistics say that neither of these ways of
looking at the relationship has an advantage over the other. Note, however, that only 5
firms in these panels have over 4,000 employees, so no implications can be drawn for
very large firms from these tests.
Table 17a: regressing the EO “advantage” over KO match in S/E (EOadv) on firm
size





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.618 .058
(Constant) 55748.241 13919.775   4.005 .000    
Employment -22.630 11.897 -.105 -1.902 .058    
Table 17b: regressing the EO “advantage” in logs over KO match in S/E (logdif)
on firm size
logdif is the natural logarithm of sales per employee for the EO firm minus the natural logarithm of sales
per employee for the corresponding aggregate KO firm




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.867 .050
(Constant) 0.124736 0.047976   2.600 .010    
Employment -0.000081 0.000041 -.108 -1.967 .050    
Tables A-1 through A-8 in the appendix give the results of the same tests as in
tables 16a and 17a, but with restricted panels. The first replication uses just the original
panel of firms thought to have 100 or more employees, then I exclude construction-
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industry firms, then I use just those EO firms and matching KO firms for which the D&B
data was marked “actual” (rather than “estimated/modeled”), and finally I use just those
firms which did not respond to the survey questionnaire; the rationale for performing
these validity checks is reviewed in the appendix. All of these give sufficiently similar
results (to the tables here) that I am satisfied that using this panel, with aggregated KO
values and deleting the three outliers, gives a valid indication of relationships among all
EO and KO firms.
Given the clear and strong effect of firm size, I continued to include employment
as a regressor, while testing each of my other independent variables in turn, to get an idea
which of my other hypotheses look promising. The results are shown in the next tables.
Table 18a: regressing EOadv on firm size and a dummy for “hard industries”
(construction and manufacturing)





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1.805 .166
(Constant) 56267.769 17888.894   3.145 .002    
Employment -22.620 11.917 -.105 -1.898 .059    
hardind -1177.682 25410.516 -.003 -.046 .963
Table 18b: regressing EOadv in logs (logdif) on firm size and a dummy for “hard
industries” (construction and manufacturing)




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.026 .050
(Constant) 0.068014 0.061451   1.107 .269    
Employment -0.000082 0.000041 -.110 -1.995 .047    
hardind 0.128581 0.087289 .081 1.473 .142
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Testing the hypothesis that the employee-owned advantage will be weaker in capital-
intensive (“hard”) industries, the size (employment) effect is still strong, and significant
with a one-tailed test (p<.030 in the first specification, p<.024 in the log specification). In
the test using linear differences in S/E, the coefficient on the indicator for hard industry
has the predicted sign, but is not close to significance. However, the log specification
shows a strong response in the opposite direction: holding firm size constant, “hard”-
industry EO firms in the panel have an average 14% higher advantage in sales per
employee over their KO matches than do “soft” ones. Had this been the predicted
relationship, the result would be significant at a one-tailed p<.071. Because of the
ambiguity of these results, however, no further tests will be done using this indicator. I
look at industrial sector effects in more detail below.
Next, I looked at the average value of the ESOP trust’s holding of firm stocks per
employee-owner, valperee; the hypothesis is that (assuming employees have some idea of
their “investment” in the firm) higher holdings will enhance a sense of ownership, and
thus encourage productive effort. The null is that the effect is zero or negative; the result
is presented in tables 19a and 19b. Holding firm size constant, this yields a very highly
significant relationship, and one which has predictive power (the F is significant at
p<.001 in the first test, and at p<.027 in the second). Firm size keeps its strong effect, and
we see that employees’ stake has a strong effect as well. For the average-size firm in this
study (mean employment = 496, excluding the outliers), a $1,000 increase in firm value
per employee-owner from the mean ($67,799) would bring the EO firm’s S/E advantage
from 17,390.3 + (-23.509*496) + (.518*67,799) = $40,823 up to $41,341—or total sales
advantage from $20.2 million to $20.5 million. The log(S/E) comparison says that,
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holding firm size constant, each increase of $1,000 in average employee stake increases
the sales-per-employee advantage of an EO firm over its matching KO by 0.1%. There is
only a 0.07% chance (1.7% for the log comparison) that we would get these results if,
among all EO and KO firms, the EO advantage were zero or lower for firms with higher
ESOP value per employee-owner.
Table 19a: EO advantage regressed on firm size and average firm value held by
ESOPs per employee-owner (valperee)





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 6.853 .001
(Constant) 17390.229 17627.430   .987 0.3247    
Employment -23.509 11.730 -.113 -2.004 0.0459    
Valperee .518 .161 .182 3.224 0.0014
Table 19b: EO advantage in logs regressed on firm size and average firm value
held by ESOPs per employee-owner (valperee)




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.667 .027
(Constant) 0.028589 0.062566   .457 .648    
Employment -0.000075 0.000042 -.103 -1.800 .073    
Valperee 0.000001 0.000001 .121 2.125 .034
Next, I look at the portion of firm value held by the ESOP trust as a whole
(ranging from 50% to 100%). Here, the effects are far from significant, and again point in
opposite directions. Note, however, that among the firms in this panel, more than half are
100%-owned by their ESOP trusts, so there is very little variation in the independent
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variable. Given the ambiguous effect and my intent to look at just whether the firm is
fully or partly owned by the ESOP trust, I will not use this variable further.
Table 20a: regressing the EO advantage on firm size and share of firm value held
by the ESOP trust





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1.908 .150
(Constant) 25433.586 68077.702   .374 .709    
Employment -22.899 11.926 -.106 -1.920 .056    
ESOPshr 34677.174 76225.315 .025 .455 .649
Table 20b: regressing the EO advantage in logs on firm size and share of firm
value held by the ESOP trust




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1.972 .141
(Constant) 0.192320 0.234680   .819 .413    
Employment -0.000080 0.000041 -.107 -1.947 .052    
ESOPshr -0.077309 0.262767 -.016 -.294 .769
Next, I look at the value for worker control derived from the factor analysis of the
survey returns, workctrl; the hypothesis is that a higher degree of worker control would
increase firms’ EO advantage. Here, the results are again weak and ambiguous. It may
well be that asking managers to report on workers’ influence and control provides less
than reliable responses; individual responses from workers, if available, could be much
more useful. However, there are interesting and potentially meaningful effects of the
responses to some individual questions in the survey, reported in tables 27 and following,
below.
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Table 21a: regressing the EO advantage on firm size and my measure of worker
influence (workctrl)





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.660 .029
(Constant) 38945.730 83332.949   .467 .641    
Employment -63.214 24.726 -.229 -2.557 .012    
WorkCtrl 757.324 2817.275 .024 .269 .789
Table 21b: regressing the EO advantage in logs on firm size and my measure of
worker influence (workctrl)




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 5.073 .008
(Constant) 0.139734 0.252042   .554 .580    
Employment -0.000233 0.000075 -.276 -3.113 .002    
WorkCtrl -0.000548 0.008521 -.006 -.064 .949
The next test is to use the survey-response measure of management intensity
(managers were asked to provide the ratio of managers to non-management workers in
their firms). This is part of the same hypothesis as the worker-control variable: that a high
mgtratio would correspond to low worker control, and thus decrease any EOadvantage.
While an increased management-to-worker ratio increases the EO advantage in the linear
test, though not with significance, it decreases it in the estimation of the logarithmic
advantage (that is, the ratio SEEO:SEKO rises as management intensity decreases), again
without significance. The weakness and ambiguity of this effect suggests that the
management ratio should not be included in further tests.
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Table 22a: regressing the EO advantage on firm size and management-to-worker
ratio





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.812 .025
(Constant) 44670.706 34212.336   1.306 .194    
Employment -64.514 24.028 -.234 -2.685 .008    
mgtratio 84982.061 141700.110 .052 .600 .550
Table 22b: regressing the EO advantage in logs on firm size and management-to-
worker ratio




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 5.514 .005
(Constant) 0.196549 0.103257   1.903 .059    
Employment -0.000233 0.000073 -.276 -3.210 .002    
mgtratio -0.387184 0.427667 -.078 -.905 .367
The next test was to divide the EO panel into firms which are fully owned by their
ESOP trust and those which are less than fully owned (note that all EO firms in the panel
are at least 50% owned by their ESOPs). The coefficient on the binary variable ownall is
in the predicted direction in both tests, and very close to significance (p<.106) in a one-
tailed test in the prediction of the linear EO advantage. In this panel, holding employment
constant, EO firms which are fully owned by their ESOP trusts have, on average, a
$31,766 higher S/E advantage over their KO matches than do those not fully ESOP-
owned, and the likelihood is less than 11% that, among all EO firms, fully-ESOP-owned
firms would not have more of an advantage over their KO matches than partly-owned
ones. The second table says that, holding employment constant, fully-employee-owned
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EO firms have a 5% higher sales-per-employee advantage over their KO counterparts
than do partially-owned firms, although this pattern is far from significant and cannot be
generalized. Because this is a strong and consistent effect, I will keep this variable in
further tests.
Table 23a: regressing EO advantage on firm size and whether or not the ESOP
trust owns all the firm stock





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 2.599 .076
(Constant) 38908.227 19328.977   2.013 .045    
Employment -23.434 11.903 -.108 -1.969 .050    
ownall 31766.377 25321.544 .069 1.255 .211
Table 23b: regressing EO advantage in logs on firm size and whether or not the
ESOP trust owns all the firm stock




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 2.094 .125
(Constant) 0.098192 0.066747   1.471 .142    
Employment -0.000082 0.000041 -.110 -1.993 .047    
ownall 0.050072 0.087440 .032 .573 .567
Putting together the three variables which seem to have strong predictive value,
we have a very impressive result (see table 24). All effects are in the hypothesized
direction, and size and value per employee are significant at p<.02 (one-tailed), and the
effect of full ownership is close to significance at p<.18 (one-tailed). Among the firms in
the panel, on average, each decrease in employment size of 100 workers increases the S/E
advantage by $2,433. Holding employment constant, an increase of $1,000 in the amount
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of firm value held by the ESOP trust per employee would, on average, increase the EO
advantage in sales per employee by $517. Holding employment and average employee
stake constant, fully employee-owned firms have, on average, a $23,896 higher EO
advantage in S/E than firms not fully owned by their ESOPs. The high F value says that
these three measures predict the EO advantage in the panel better than random guesses,
and the high significances say that it is very unlikely that any of these effects are absent
or go in the opposite direction among all EO and matching KO firms.
Table 24: regressing the EO advantage on firm size, average firm value per
employee-owner, and whether the firm is fully owned by the ESOP trust





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 4.855 .003
(Constant) 5428.158 21816.061   .249 .804    
Employment -24.332 11.766 -.117 -2.068 .039    
Valperee .517 .161 .182 3.216 .001
ownall 23895.587 25665.728 .053 .931 .353
Sector effects
I have already failed to sustain the hypothesis that employee ownership is more
effective in improving sales per employee in more labor-intensive industries than in more
capital-intensive ones, at least using the crude dichotomy of calling industries in NAICS
sectors 2 and 3 (construction and utilities; and manufacturing) “capital-intensive”
(hardind = 1) and those in sectors 4 and 5 (retail, wholesale, and transportation; and
information and business services) “labor-intensive” (hardind = 0) (because there were
very few firms in NAICS sectors 1, 6, 7, and 8, I omitted these in the sector
comparisons). But I must ask what (if any) difference industrial sector may make in any
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employee-ownership effect. Thus I introduce binary indicators (“dummies”) for these
sectors and look at the regression of EO advantage on the three predictive variables
above, plus these dummies. Holding firm size, ESOP value per employee, and whether
the firm is fully employee-owned constant, sector 4 firms (retail, wholesale, and
transportation) have, on average, a greater advantage in S/E over their KO matches than
do firms in other sectors. Construction and utilities firms come next (though there are
very few utilities in this panel), then manufacturing firms, and firms in sector 5
(information and business services, which includes financial firms) have the lowest EO
advantage. None of these differences are significant, but this rank-ordering is robust to
other specifications. Dropping ownall, for example, because of its weak effect in this
specification, leaves the ordering among the 4 sectors undisturbed; see table 26. In the
specification in table 26, EO information and business service firms at the mean value per
employee have lower sales per employee predicted than their matching KO firms if they
have more than 150 employees; for manufacturing the “break-even” is at 1,480
employees, for construction 2,970, and for retail-wholesale, 4,940 employees.
Table 25: regressing EO advantage on 3 predictive values, and on dummies for
industrial sector
Omitted sector: construction and utilities





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.981 .001
(Constant) 25836.472 37777.602   .684 .495    
Employment -23.481 12.220 -.111 -1.922 .056    
Valperee .519 .164 .182 3.172 .002
ownall 12837.851 26809.783 .028 .479 .632
Manufacturing -33846.459 40662.077 -.067 -.832 .406
Retail, wholesale, & transportation 44861.408 41332.384 .086 1.085 .279
Information & business services -62259.430 41298.626 -.121 -1.508 .133
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Table 26: regressing EO advantage on 2 predictive values, and on dummies for
industrial sector
Omitted sector: construction and utilities





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 4.744 .000
(Constant) 32980.777 34659.652   .952 .342    
Employment -22.935 12.150 -.108 -1.888 .060    
Valperee .519 .163 .182 3.174 .002
Manufacturing -34119.430 40603.069 -.067 -.840 .401
Retail, wholesale, & transportation 45117.869 41272.995 .087 1.093 .275
Information & business services -64677.344 40933.318 -.125 -1.580 .115
While it has been suggested that the higher EO advantage in retail-wholesale may be
because these are industries in which employee-owners have direct contact with
customers, I hesitate to try to explain this rank-ordering among industrial sectors. I just
report it as a curious result of this study, and leave possible explanations for future
research.
Further investigation of worker influence effects
After discovering that the workctrl factor derived from the 17 questions in the
survey had an effect that was not significantly different from zero, it occurred to me that
there might be valuable information in the answers to individual questions in the survey
grid. I regressed EOadv on firm size (employment in the EO firm) and each score in the
grid separately; the results are presented in table 27. Employment retained its large and
significant effect throughout. Note, however, that there are three questions which have
large effects (and thus high significances): innovation in work processes, new products,
and marketing, all of which can be interpreted as having a relationship to innovation in
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the workplace. The standard deviations of these three scores are all close to unity (0.90,
1.07, and 1.22, respectively). The mean response for innovation is 3.2, slightly higher
than “workers are asked their opinions and these are taken seriously;” a change to 4.2
(just above “workers have formal mechanisms for input, and receive feedback”) would,
on average, increase EOadv by $32,362. Similarly, the means for new products and
marketing are 2.5 and 2.4 respectively, halfway between “workers may make
suggestions” and “workers are asked their opinions and these are taken seriously.” A one-
point increase here (to between “workers are asked their opinions and these are taken
seriously” and “workers have formal mechanisms for input, and receive feedback”)
would, on average, increase EOadv by $47,649 (for new products) or $37,620 (for
marketing). I have no explanation for the weaker (and sometimes negative) effects of the
other 14 scores.
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Table 27: Regressing EOadv on employment and on each of the response scores to
survey questions (separately)
Worker influence on… Coefficient Significance (2-tailed)
Innovation in work processes 32362.30 0.161
Safety procedures -17667.64 0.402
Physical layout of environment -6026.50 0.792
Quality control 6311.15 0.742
Investment policies -1022.84 0.965
Hiring and promotions -11679.63 0.589
Equipment maintenance 5492.51 0.783
Company philanthropy -1499.71 0.937
Wage levels -20550.27 0.386
Overtime allocation -14429.31 0.401
Work schedules -11823.81 0.551
New products 47648.53 0.021
Marketing 37619.76 0.050
Evaluating supervisors -10427.26 0.586
Equipment purchases 6976.08 0.758
Benefit offerings -9176.35 0.681
Profit allocation 23787.81 0.365
The next question is whether these three responses can be built into a new worker-
influence score. I did a new factor analysis, with just these three scores. The resulting
factor explains 74.35% of the total variance in the three scores, and the weightings are
presented in table 28.32 This new score (“innov”), used as a regressor in combination with
employment, has a large and significant effect in the linear specification, and firm size
retains its strong effect. Adjusting for the weights of the underlying responses, and
holding firm size constant, a one-point increase in worker influence on innovation in
work processes would, on average, increase the EOadv by $14,563; for influence on new
products, $16,592; and, for influence on marketing, the increase would be $16,182.  In
                                                 
32 As with the previous factor analysis, when deriving index scores using the factor
weights, I assigned the mean for each question to missing data points.
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the log specification, holding employment constant, a one-point increase in “innov”
increases the EO advantage ratio by 2.7%. In both specifications the constant is negative,
presumably because of the need to account for high variation in innov. At the mean
employment of 496 and mean innov score of 6.5, the linear regression predicts an EO
advantage of $30,220, and the log regression predicts a 1.2% EO advantage.
Table 28: Factor derived from three survey items
Worker influence on … Weight in factor
Correlation with
consolidating variable
Innovation in work processes .795 0.746
New products .905 0.914
Marketing .883 0.893
Table 29a: Regressing EOadv on firm size and the new factor (innov, for influence
on innovation) for worker influence




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 6.020 .003
(Constant) -61295.000 61066.338   -1.004 .317    
Employment -56.706 23.932 -.206 -2.369 .019    
innov 18328.014 8609.295 .185 2.129 .035
Table 29b: Regressing logdif on firm size and the new factor (innov, for influence
on innovation) for worker influence





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig.  5.625 .005 
(Constant) -0.053602 0.187218   -.286 .775
Employment -0.000220 0.000073 -.261 -2.998 .003
innov 0.026719 0.026394 .088 1.012 .313
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Further investigation, building the earlier influential variables (valperee and
ownall) back into the regression, show a weaker (but still significant) effect for innov,
although these other two variables lose their strength. Table 30 shows the results of the
estimate. Holding size, full-ownership, and employee stake constant, a one-point increase
in production-worker influence on any of these three types of innovation would, on
average, increase the EOadv on the order of $19,000. It is less than 1.8% likely that we
would see this result if, among all EO firms and KO matches, increased worker influence
decreases or has no effect on EO advantage. But when compared to table 26, neither the
size effect nor the influence-on-innovation effect has changed much, and the F score has
decreased, although it is still significantly different from unity (indicating that the
regression estimator predicts the dependent variable better than random guesses). This
suggests that, once we account for size effects, what makes the most difference in EO
advantage (among factors that we can generalize to all firms) is production workers’
ability to influence innovation in work processes, products, and marketing. A 3-point
increase in employee influence on innovation in work processes, new products, or
marketing (say, from “workers have no influence at all” to “workers have formal
mechanisms for input, and receive feedback”) would improve EO advantage about as
much as a decrease in firm size of 1,000 employees.
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Table 30: Regressing EOadv on firm size, average firm value per employee-
owner, whether the firm is 100% employee-owned, and the degree of production-











 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 3.121 .018
(Constant) -115219.524 80763.691  -1.427 .157   
Employment -57.465 24.159 -.225 -2.379 .019   
Valperee .132 .276 .045 .480 .632
ownall 39209.558 47411.327 .078 .827 .410
innov 19833.958 9327.786 .203 2.126 .036
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
There is a long history of studies of employee ownership around the world, but
there is a shorter history of such studies for U.S. firms, corresponding to the novelty and
near-invisibility of this sector. This study attempts to use a fairly large group of
employee-owned firms, matched with similar capital-owned firms, to evaluate several
hypotheses about such firms’ productivity, relative to traditional (capital-owned) firms.
Many theorists have suggested that the rarity of employee ownership (at least at a
level at which ownership becomes more than token, 50% ownership in this study) is
prima facie evidence that such firms could not be as efficient as traditional firms, because
otherwise they would be more common. But institutional and financing constraints may
be a more realistic explanation for their rarity, and it is important for policy purposes to
investigate efficiency objectively.
The most straightforward comparison between the employee-owned groups and
their capital-owned matching firms gave the strongest result: on average, EO firms in the
test panel have much higher sales per employee ($44,500) than their KO matches (in
cases with multiple matches, the KO values are averages of all matching firms); statistical
tests suggest that it is very unlikely that the opposite could be true among all EO and KO
firms. A similar test using logs of sales per employee, to look at ratios rather than
differences, shows that the average employee-owned firm has an 8.8% advantage over its
matched KO firms, and this pattern can be generalized as well. This confirms the major
hypothesis of the paper.
Some arguments about the effectiveness of employee ownership suggest that
employee ownership would make more of a difference in smaller firms, where firm
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operations and structure may be more transparent, and a culture of “this is ours” might be
more credible to workers.33 The test of the firm-size effect confirmed this hypothesis for
this panel, with each 100 additional workers leading, on average, to a decrease of $2,263
in the sales-per-employee advantage employee-owned firms have over capital-owned
ones, or a 0.8% decrease using a ratio measure. This result, too, has strong statistical
significance, and it is very unlikely that the pattern could be the reverse among all firms.
Two hypotheses were not confirmed. Testing whether more capital-intensive
firms would  have weaker sales-per-employee advantages (employee-owned over
matching capital-owned), and whether firms in which the employees (through their ESOP
Trust) owned a larger percentage of the firm’s stocks would have stronger sales-per-
employee advantages, led to weak and ambiguous results. Were larger panels (or better
data) available, these questions might be worth pursuing.
More effective, though, was the magnitude of employees’ ownership value, as
measured by the average value of each ESOP Trust’s firm stock ownership per
employee-owner. The hypothesis is that (assuming employees are aware of the value of
their holdings, even though they are not liquid) higher per-person values increase
workers’ sense of ownership, and/or the prominence of ownership in the culture of the
firm. Holding firm size constant, an increase of $1,000 in the average employee’s
ownership of firm value leads to an average increase of $518 in sales-per-employee
                                                 
33 A recent study by Freeman, Blasi, Kruse, and Mackin (2007) observes that “shared
capitalism [such as ESOPs] has beneficial effects on all outcomes save for absenteeism
and that it has its strongest effects when combined with … high-performance work
policies (employee involvement, training, and job security)…. The interaction of the
effects of shared capitalism with other corporate policies suggests that the various shared
capitalist and other policies may operate through a latent variable, ‘corporate culture’”
(from the abstract).
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advantage in this panel, or, using ratio measures, a 0.1% increase. These results are also
statistically significant, meaning that it is very unlikely that the reverse relationship
would hold among all firms.
Another hypothesis emerged as the study progressed: that full ownership of the
firm by the ESOP Trust might make a positive difference (in the sales-per-employee
advantage) over part-ownership. This was verified by the tests in this series; holding firm
size and firm value owned per employee constant, fully employee-owned firms in the
panel have, on average, $23,900 higher sales per employee advantage over KO
counterparts than partly employee-owned firms (the smallest share here being 50%), or a
5% higher advantage as a ratio. While this result cannot be confidently generalized to all
firms, it is still strongly indicative of the effect of full ownership on firm culture.
The most innovative and interesting part of this study (to the researcher) was an
attempt to develop a measure of non-management employee control over or influence in
their employment situation, using a survey questionnaire. While this was done partly
because previous studies have strongly suggested that ownership and influence have
synergistic effects on productivity, and my own hypotheses built on these, it was also
done because I believe not enough attention is paid to workplace democracy in general,
and I think it would be very useful to have a validated metric for this dimension. One
measure that came from the survey, which I had interpreted as a measure of worker
control, had an ambiguous influence on sales-per-employee advantage of employee-
owned firms, and I cannot argue that it is a valid measure of worker control or influence.
A measure that incorporated fewer of the survey results, however, did have
substantial and significant effect on the sales-per-employee advantage, holding firm size
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constant. The three scores included were those on production worker influence on
innovation in work processes, new products, and marketing, all of which seem to have
some relation to innovations in general; to some extent the observed effect validates this
“innovation” measure. It remains for further investigation to determine why other scores
had weaker (or negative) effects, and to develop and validate better measures of worker
influence and job control.
The other measure from the survey, the ratio of managers to non-management
workers at surveyed firms, had an ambiguous effect as well. I had expected that firms
with higher management intensity would leave little room for employee initiative,
weakening or negating any potential productivity advantage from employee ownership.
However, the results of this test were weak, and in opposite directions in the two
specifications.
Another provocative (and unexplained) result of the analysis here is that, holding
several of these relevant factors constant, firms in the retail, wholesale, and transportation
sector tend to have greater sales-per-employee advantages than those in construction and
utilities, which in turn have greater advantages than those in manufacturing, and these in
turn have greater advantages than those in information and business services (other
sectors, such as arts and leisure or general services, had too few cases to include in these
comparisons). While these results were statistically weak, they were consistent in various
specifications, and there are no obvious (to me) explanations for this ordering of effects;
a closer look at the raw data—or further research—may lead to some speculation, but that
is not on the agenda for now.
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I started this work believing that workplace democracy (for which employee
ownership may be a necessary, but not sufficient, predicate) is a good in itself, in its
effects on workers’ lives both inside and outside the workplace. Efforts to bring shared
ownership to employees (beyond top management) have come from some of these
beliefs, as well as a sense that broader ownership of businesses would lead to a more
equitable distribution of wealth, and a healthier polity. But there is a lot of inertia to
overcome to broaden employee ownership among U.S. businesses, and academic
arguments that such a program might reduce productivity have been part of that
resistance. I hope that this experiment may be part of proving those assumptions wrong.
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Appendix
In chapters 4 and 5, several concerns were raised about the validity of the panel as
constructed. The small discrepancy in distribution of industry sectors among the smaller
(added later) firms, compared to all smaller EO firms, led to a concern about including
these at all. Tables A-1 and A-2 show the results of omitting these firms from the
analyses represented in tables 16a and 17a above; the results are similar enough to
suggest that these firms can indeed be included; lower significance here may just be a
result of the smaller panel size.
Table A-1: paired-sample differences test, original panel without smaller firms
added (compare table 16a)
  Paired Samples Statistics    
 
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SEEO 232645.6315 258 447831.27579 27880.75741
SEKO 162881.0099 258 123397.55706 7682.39634
 Paired Samples Test       
 Paired Differences







Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
SEEO -
SEKO
69764 449145 27962 14699 124829 2.495 257 .013
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Table A-2: regressing the EO “advantage” over KO match in S/E (EOadv) on firm
size, without smaller firms (compare table 17a)
  Coefficients  
Dependent Variable:




  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 2.061 .152
(Constant) 89009.556 32614.623   2.729 .007    
Employment -34.175 23.807 -.091 -1.436 .152    
During a discussion I had with a construction firm manager (I had had a question
about the meaning of one of her survey responses), she pointed out that many of their
projects involved contracting work to non-employees. Since non-employees would not be
subject to employee ownership effects, I realized that I should replicate some of these
tests without construction firms in the data. Tables A-3 and A-4 perform the same tests as
presented in tables 16a and 17a, but without the construction firms. The results are
similar enough to suggest that these firms can indeed be included—in fact the weaker
results here suggest that ownership effects may be stronger in construction firms.
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Table A-3: paired-sample differences test, panel without construction firms
(compare table 16a)
 Paired Samples Statistics   
 
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
SEEO 200073.8634 276 226527.86495 13635.37514
SEKO 160560.4382 276 118778.39755 7149.61936











39513 221175 13313 13305 65722 2.968 275 .003
Table A-4: regressing the EO “advantage” over KO match in S/E (EOadv) on firm
size, without construction firms (compare table 17a)







  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. .759 .384a
(Constant) 45275.065 14871.083   3.045 .003    
Employment -12.290 14.110 -.053 -.871 .384    
I noted in the methodology discussion that I was concerned that the D&B data
marked “estimated/modeled” might be based on algorithms using only (or primarily)
employment and industry as arguments, thus leading to similar or identical sales per
employee for EO firms and KO matches that both have estimated data. While I did not
expect D&B to reveal their algorithms, I thought I might at least find out what arguments
were used, but queries to their data people led noplace. Thus I performed these same two
tests using just EO data marked “actual,” and KO matches to those firms marked
98
“actual;” the results are in tables A-5 and A-6. These results show no reason to doubt the
full-panel results in tables 16a and 17a. In particular, while the EO advantage is lower in
the full panel ($44,500 rather than $78,250), it has much more significance (p<.0003,
compared to p<.0015 here), and employment effects are more significant as well, at least
partly because the doubled panel size there increases test power. My concern that
including estimated data would weaken any effect has been assuaged. My advisers assure
me that D&B data is generally thought to be reliable; thus it makes sense to use the larger
(full) panels to maximize sample size.
Table A-5: paired-sample differences test, using only data marked “actual”
(compare table 16a)
 Paired Samples Statistics   
 
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SEEO 293233.9598 163 326621.95184 25583.00570
SEKO 214982.2319 163 150217.22262 11765.92094
 Paired Samples Test      
 Paired Differences












78252 334080 26167 26579 129924 2.990 162 .003
Table A-6: regressing the EO “advantage” over KO match in S/E (EOadv) on firm
size, using only data marked “actual” (compare table 17a)





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. .448 .504
(Constant) 86262.221 28812.064   2.994 .003    
Employment -17.020 25.415 -.053 -.670 .504    
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Another question raised in discussions with advisers was whether there might be
systematic self-selection among firms which returned surveys. To examine this, I
performed these same tests, but excluding those firms which returned survey
questionnaires. The results in table A-7 are nearly identical to those in table 16a, though
with lower significance (reflecting the 39% drop in panel size). Table A-8 shows almost
no effect of firm size on the EO advantage, unlike table 17a, but I would argue that this is
because eliminating firms which returned the survey eliminates almost the entire group of
firms with employment below 100, weakening this test a priori.  To show the basis for
this argument, figure A-1 compares the size distributions of the panels with and without
survey respondents.
Table A-7: paired-sample differences test, using only firms which did not respond







SEEO 208479 201 228381 16109
SEKO 162771 201 123651 8722
  Paired Samples Test    
  Paired Differences    










SEKO 45708 224928 15865 14424 76993 2.881 200 .004
100
Table A-8: regressing the EO “advantage” over KO match in S/E (EOadv) on firm
size, using only firms which did not respond to the survey questionnaire (compare
table 17a)





  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. .427 .514
(Constant) 51443 18148.587   2.835 .005    
Employment -9 13.826 -.046 -.654 .514    













Validity check: use all matching firms
Prof. Thurston has raised a question as to whether the paired-sample differences
test, with each group of matching firms aggregated, deletes some useful information. I
consulted Prof. Ted Joyce, a health economist who teaches microeconometrics. He
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agreed that this was the proper way to analyze the data, given the structure of my data.34
With some brainstorming, however, he developed a structure for a test that would allow
all matching firms to be included. This involves regressing sales per employee on an
indicator (dummy) for employee ownership, controlling for the variability of the other
characteristics and sizes of matching groups by including (as regressors) indicators for
each employee-owned + matches group, and clustering errors within each employee-
owned + matches group. One analogy is to treatment of one person in each family; to
tease out the treatment effect, other characteristics of the family must be held constant by
including family dummies. Another analogy would be to establishing a new educational
program in one school in each school district; to tease out effects, when comparing
results to schools in the same district, other characteristics of the school district must be
held constant. Including the group dummies means that we are looking only at within-
group (excluding between-group) differences. The results of these tests are in tables A-9
through A-13, and agree fairly consistently with the tests using aggregated KO firms.
                                                 
34 The analogous situation in health economics would be with matched panels of subjects,
with one panel being treated and one not (here the “treatment” is employee ownership),
and comparing some measure (e.g., blood pressure) after the treatment.
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Table A-9: using all KO matches, regress sales per employee on an indicator for
employee ownership (iseo) and on indicators for each group of employee-owned
firms with their matches (compare table 16a)
(omitted dummy: d2)
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2522
F( 33,   327) =       .
Prob > F      =       .
R-squared     =  0.0981
Root MSE      =  4.1e+05
(Std. Err. adjusted for 328 clusters in match)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Robust
salesperee       Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>t     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        iseo    45421.14    13573.8     3.35   0.001     18718.15    72124.12
          d3   -215502.7    1131.15  -190.52   0.000      -217728   -213277.5
          d4   -250645.5   2262.299  -110.79   0.000      -255096     -246195
          d6     -172669   2585.485   -66.78   0.000    -177755.3   -167582.7
          d7     -330960   2262.299  -146.29   0.000    -335410.5   -326509.5
          d8   -194842.5    1131.15  -172.25   0.000    -197067.7   -192617.2
          d9     -170657   2.67e-06        .   0.000      -170657     -170657
 (results for 322 additional case dummies deleted)
       _cons      442014   4524.598    97.69   0.000       433113    450914.9
This analysis says that, holding aside characteristics that differ among the
matching groups, there is, on average, a $45,400 advantage in sales per employee for
employee-owned firms over their KO matches, with a one-tailed confidence of 99.95%.
This is nearly identical to a $44,524 EO advantage (p<.0003, or 99.97% confidence) from
the paired-sample differences analysis, using aggregated matches, presented in table 16a
above. Next, I tried a regression using the EO indicator and employment times the
indicator, keeping the case dummies because, again, I want to look only at differences
within match groups.35 These results are presented in table A-10.
                                                 
35 A regression without the case dummies gives the expected sign on the employment
variable, but with no significance (p<.301). That result just reflects whether, across a
broad range of EO firms of different types, S/E responds to firm size.
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Table A-10: using all KO matches, regress sales per employee on an
indicator for employee ownership (iseo), on firm size times the indicator,
and on indicators for each group of employee-owned firms with their
matches (compare table 17a)
(omitted dummy: d2)
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2522
                                                       F(  1,   327) =       .
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0984
                                                       Root MSE      =  4.1e+05
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 328 clusters in match)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  salesperee |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        iseo |   55246.89   15116.14     3.65   0.000     25509.74    84984.05
      eoempl |  -21.73792   11.51291    -1.89   0.060    -44.38664    .9107928
          d3 |  -264355.1   25749.57   -10.27   0.000    -315010.8   -213699.4
 (results for 326 additional case dummies omitted)
       _cons |   504713.3   32919.73    15.33   0.000     439952.1    569474.5
This says that the average difference in sales per employee between EO firms and their
matching KO firms is $55,247 - $21.74 times employment, or $44,465 at the mean
employment of 496; table 17a (using just aggregate KO S/E) gave this as $55,748 -
$22.63 times employment, again a nearly identical result. The one-tailed significance
here is p<.0005 for the EO effect and p<.030 for the employment effect; in table 17a they
were p<.0005 and p<.027, respectively.
Attempts to do these regressions with the EO indicator and any of the variables
which exist only for EO firms fail, because there are no values for the KO firm matches,
and the regression cannot distinguish (identify) whether variation is assigned to the EO
indicator or to the EO-specific measure. Table A-11 is typical.
104
Table A-11: using all KO matches, regress sales per employee on an
indicator for employee ownership (iseo), on the indicator times employment,
and on average employee’s share of the value of the ESOP trust (valperee)
. regress salesperee iseo eoempl valperee
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     303
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   300) =    9.61
       Model |  9.1924e+11     2  4.5962e+11           Prob > F      =  0.0001
    Residual |  1.4344e+13   300  4.7815e+10           R-squared     =  0.0602
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0540
       Total |  1.5264e+13   302  5.0542e+10           Root MSE      =  2.2e+05
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  salesperee |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        iseo |  (dropped)
      eoempl |  -9.528044   11.52868    -0.83   0.409    -32.21537    13.15928
    valperee |   .6859067    .157795     4.35   0.000     .3753815    .9964319
       _cons |   165177.4   17325.32     9.53   0.000     131082.8    199271.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As far as I can tell, the only other way to use all KO data is with regressions by industrial
sector, a variable present for all firms. I constructed dummies for each of four sectors,
conditioned on whether firms are EO or not; tables A-12 and A-13 present results with
and without case dummies.36 Note that without case dummies, the sector effects wash out
any size effect, but that the size effect is still strong (as are all sector effects) with the
case dummies present, and coefficients on EO and EO times employment are very similar
to those in table A-10 above. The results in table A-12 say that, holding size constant, the
EO sales-per-employee advantage is highest among construction firms, then among retail
and wholesale firms, then among information and business service firms, and lowest
among manufacturing firms. The sector results without case dummies (A-13), however,
are much closer to those in tables 25 and 26. I offer no explanation for the difference in
the sequence (I have none for the sequence in the earlier tables either).
                                                 
36 As in tables 25 and 26, the other NAICS sectors, with many fewer cases than these 4,
are omitted.
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Table A-12: using all KO matches, regress sales per employee on an
indicator for employee ownership (iseo), on the indicator times employment,
on indicators for employee ownership in each of 4 sectors, and on case
dummies (compare tables 25 and 26)
(omitted sector: construction; omitted case: d2)
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2427
                                                       F(  1,   314) =       .
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0953
                                                       Root MSE      =  4.2e+05
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 315 clusters in match)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  salesperee |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        iseo |   56456.15   15525.52     3.64   0.000     25908.95    87003.36
      eoempl |  -21.77696   12.17998    -1.79   0.075    -45.74166    2.187733
       eomfg |  -434906.9   37145.44   -11.71   0.000    -507992.3   -361821.5
   eoretwhol |  -229263.6   32995.21    -6.95   0.000    -294183.2   -164343.9
      eoinfo |  -332799.2   2587.587  -128.61   0.000    -337890.4     -327708
          d3 |   170563.4   10407.48    16.39   0.000     150086.2    191040.6
       (313 other case dummies not shown)
       _cons |   504428.7   35031.89    14.40   0.000     435501.8    573355.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-13: using all KO matches, regress sales per employee on an
indicator for employee ownership (iseo), on the indicator times employment,
and on indicators for employee ownership in each of 4 sectors (compare
tables 25 and 26)
(omitted sector: construction)
Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2427
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  2421) =    9.44
       Model |  7.9658e+12     5  1.5932e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  4.0876e+14  2421  1.6884e+11           R-squared     =  0.0191
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0171
       Total |  4.1672e+14  2426  1.7177e+11           Root MSE      =  4.1e+05
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  salesperee |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        iseo |   46199.72   27005.25     1.71   0.087    -6756.077    99155.52
      eoempl |  -3.941311   21.91591    -0.18   0.857     -46.9172    39.03458
       eomfg |  -59113.98   23751.43    -2.49   0.013    -105689.2   -12538.75
   eoretwhol |   71395.29   23923.53     2.98   0.003     24482.58      118308
      eoinfo |  -65331.11   23955.24    -2.73   0.006      -112306   -18356.22
       _cons |   186452.3   17331.64    10.76   0.000     152465.9    220438.6
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Validity check: test by employment quartile
Prof. Kruse has pointed out that, given the structure of these regressions, errors in
employment numbers might create a consistent bias in the regression coefficients on firm
size. A suggested way to check for this is to do the paired-differences test by employment
quartiles (rather than using continuous employment data).  Table A-14 reports the results
of the paired-sample differences test by employment quartile. While there is an
unexplained decrease in the mean difference (and significance) for the second quartile of
firms, the mean SEEO-SEKO remains positive for each quartile.
Table A-14: Paired-sample differences, sales per employee for EO firms and KO
matches, by employment quartile
 Paired Samples Test      








Mean Lower Upper t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
SEEO - SEKO 66996 275706 29905 7528 126465 2.240 84 .028








Mean Lower Upper t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
SEEO - SEKO 11046 165569 18397 -25565 47656 .600 80 .550







of the Difference t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
    Lower Upper    
SEEO - SEKO 62358 201017 21803 19000 105717 2.860 84 .005








Mean Lower Upper t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
SEEO - SEKO 35249 257631 29360 -23227 93724 1.201 76 .234
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Questionnaire on worker participation in firm management in employee-owned firms
City University of New York, Dept. of Economics Brent Kramer, PhD candidate
Survey instructions
• Please fill this out to the best of your ability, and mail it back in the enclosed
SASE.
• Questions about “workers” refer to (all) non-management workers.
• If you feel any answer needs qualification or explanation, please star (*) your
answer and attach a separate page with the explanation.
• If your firm has more than one location, please photocopy this survey and fill it
out as appropriate for each location (U.S. locations only). Thank you.
Firm ___________________________________________________________________
Location(s) (see instruction above)
_______________________________________________________________________
Industry product type (most general classification) _______________________________
NAICS _________   EIN __________________
Please check here if your firm is no longer employee-owned ______
(do not complete the survey)
Percent of company value owned by employees (through ESOP or other means) _______
Total number of employees at this location ____  Number participating in ESOP _____
Number of non-management (including “production”) workers at this location ________
Number of workers at this location represented by a union ___________
Estimated ratio of managers* to non-management workers ___________
*only those with managerial or supervisory functions, not clerical or solely administrative
Do workers choose any members of the Board of Directors? _________
If yes, how many?   ____ members out of _____ total on the board.
PLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS ON OTHER SIDE AS WELL
For verification purposes (in case I have questions about your responses):
Your name _______________________________
Your company position __________________________
Phone number _______________________ Email _____________________________
Company-specific details will not be revealed to anyone, verbally or in print.
Questions: bkramer@gc.cuny.edu, or 917-887-5640 (10 am – 4 pm EST)
Return to: Brent Kramer, 477 17th St., Brooklyn, NY 11215
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For each type of decision, please indicate the extent of non-management worker






























































PLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS ON OTHER SIDE AS WELL
Company-specific details will not be revealed to anyone, verbally or in print.
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